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THE NONRATIONAL FACTOR IN J. B. PRATT’S DUALISM
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. The nature of the problem.
VVhat does J. B. Pratt mean by the nonrational factor?
i|
j
Why has he included such an element in his philosophy, and of
!
i what importance is it? These questions epitomize the problem
of this investigation. The most adequate answers can be found
by looking in two directions; first, to the framework and struc-
ture of Pratt’s particular philosophy^ secondly, to the history
of philosophy where others have faced the same perplexities as
Pratt and have given similar or different answers.
These two directions in which to look for answers to ques-
tions about a nonrational factor suggest tPie techniques to be
I
used in its investigation. One technique which will be employed
is that of analysis and internal criticism. By this method
Pratt’s philosophy, especially his epistemological dualism, will
be taken apart and resolved into its constituent elements. Then
attention may be focussed on one aspect, in this case the non-
rational factor, in its relation to others. The understanding
of these relations will throw some light on the meaning of the
term. Such analysis can provide a basis for internal criticism
which tries to understand a philosophy from v/ithin, which ques-
tions the relationships of its parts, and which evaluates a
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position not primarily in terms of its ambitions but in terms
of its dialectic. Analysis and internal criticism, then, is
concerned with the logic of Pratt’s arguments and the consist-
ency of the nonrational factor with his other views.
Another technique which will be used in this investiga-
tion is historical criticism, Ey this method the various ele-
ments of Pratt’s philosophy, especially the nonrational factor,
will be viewed as exemplifying certain issues and ideas which
have been carried to the present in the great traditions of
philosophy to which Pratt and every other philosopher is great-
ly indebted. Historical criticism v/ill amplify Pratt’s argu-
ments by bringing in their past. It will suggest alternative
solutions to certain problems for which the nonrational factor
has some relevance.
The explanation of the problem of this investigation has
already suggested its scope. The methods of internal and his-
torical criticism will be used to ascertain the general meaning
I
of the nonrational factor, its importance in Pratt’s philosophy,
and its relevance for traditional philosophical issues. These
tasks naturally require examination of the numerous articles and
books written by Pratt himself,^ They are the primary sources.
^ The most comprehensive expression of Pratt’s views is to be
found in his recent Personal Realism , As the footnotes and re-
ferences will indicate, this is the most important of the pri-
mary sources. The New York Times Book Review of March 12, 1939
announced Pratt’s latest book. Naturalism (Yale University
Press), "The author tells what naturalism is and discusses it
in relation to life, evolution, mind, morality, and religion,"
(34)
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The secondary sources are the criticisms of Pratt’s vievirs and
those writings which must he used in historical criticism.
All the information derived from these sources will be
used to clarify the meaning, basis, and importance of the non-
rational factor within the limits of three main topics or chap-
ters, After this introductory chapter which poses the problem
for investigation, defines certain important terms, and offers
a brief historical interpretation of the main problem, there
will follow the second chapter which explains the basis of the
assertion of a nonrational factor. It will show the place of
the nonrational factor in the structure of Pratt’s basic argu-
ments, Chapter three will deal with the metaphysical signifi-
cance of the nonrational factor. Its theme will be the part
played by the nonrational factor in the answers to such primal
questions as: What is existence or being? What are universals?
And is the self real? Chapter four will present a criticism of
the reasons for asserting a nonrational factor and an examina-
tion of some of its implications. This does not mean, however,
that the criticism of Pratt’s arguments relevant to the main
problem will be confined to the last chapter. The whole enter-
prise of determining the meaning, basis, and importance of the
nonrational factor involves criticism. Rather, chapter four
will present an evaluation of some of the broad consequences of
Pratt’s assertion of a nonrational factor.
An introductory chapter may have the purpose of stating
some of the presuppositions of any Investigation as well as pre-
3
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paring the reader for what is to follow. In a sense, the de-
finitions of fundamental terms are statements of presupposi-
tions, for the definitions establish a preliminary agreement
about the meaning of basic terms. Since the substance of the
investigation does amplify its basic categories, however, the
most that can be done in an introduction is to suggest some de-
finitions as a point of departure. The subsequent chapters
naturally give a fuller definition of the basic terms,
B. Definitions,
In order to "begin at the beginning" there must be at
least a tentative and sketchy answer to the question: ^/That is
meant by nonrational factor? And since the primary concern is
the meaning and importance of this element in Pratt’s dualism,
the further question must be tentatively answered: What kind
of dualism is being referred to?
For introductory purposes the term nonrational factor
may best be understood in Pratt’s own words. Although his de-
'
finition of meaning implies the existence of a nonrational fac-
tor2 actual use of the term in Personal Realism does not occur
until the chapter devoted to "Existence," There the distinction
between essence and existence entails the assertion that "con-
p The words element and factor will be used interchangably in
connection with the term nonrational.
1
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cepts or definable natures are not the whole of the real” and
"that there is in the existent world a non-rational element."^
These statements, as will be shovm more fully later, imply that
in anything which may be said to exist there is something beside
the reasoning about it and conceptions of it. There is also a
nonrational element which is given as brute fact. Here Pratt
retains Plato's thesis that knowledge of existence, of the world
of becoming and change, is partly "unreasoning sensation."^
These characterizations of the nonrational factor define it
negatively and positively. The nonrational factor, negatively
defined, is that which is more than and beyond concepts, defin-
able natures, and expressed qualities. Positively defined, it
is the given brute fact of unreasoning sensation. Both aspects
of the definition are brought together in one of Pratt's state-
I
ments: "The givenness of the existent is not a definable quali-|
ty and hence. . .there is in existence a non-rational but purely
empirical element,"^
In addition to "nonrational factor" there is another
term, really the primary frame of reference of this whole essay,
which demands definition. That is the term dualism which may
refer either to the knowledge process or to the aspects of being.
j
^ Pratt, PR, 52-3, 55, See bibliography for explanation of
standard abbreviations,
4 Jowett, DP, II, 523. Of. Pratt, PR, 54.
5 Pratt, PR, 58.
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Although Pratt’s philosophy includes both types of dualism, his
epistemological dualism is more relevant to the present problem.
Moreover, as will be shown later, it is the most distinctive
and influential aspect of Pratt’s personal realism,®
V/hat is epistemological dualism? It is the theory that
there is an ineradicable difference between the content of the
mind and its object. The object may be a physical thing, a
logical entity, or another person, but it can never be reduced
to or be identical with the idea of it. Knowledge is always
indirect and representative, and the content of the mind refers
to or conceives the object, Pratt further defines dualism in
more technical terms: The mind has an epistemological object
and conceives it as characterizing an existent or ontological
object. Epistemological dualism stands in contrast to monism,
whose errors, as will be shown later, Pratt has sought to avoid
with his dualistic personal realism. In epistemological monism
the object is identified with the contents of the mind; the
idea and object become one.
® Chapters XVI, XVII, and XVIII of Pratt’s Personal Realism
have the same purpose as his Matter and Spirit
, to show that
there is a fundamental dualism of being in the universe, Cf,
Pratt, PR, 72; MS, 215-17, This is not however, what is meant
by Pratt’s dualism as it is referred to in this essay. Here it
means the epistemological dualism which distinguishes personal
realism from other types of realism, "Dualistic Realism," says
Pratt, "seems to me to indicate more clearly [than critical
realism"} the hypothesis intended. There is, of course, danger
that the adjective dualistic might be interpreted to refer to
the mind-body problem, while as a fact, the hypothesis presentee
is purely epistemological and would fit a Berkeleyan universe
as well as a Cartesian," Pratt, PR, 192. Cf, also, PR, 135;
Pratt, Art, 15, 151,

Some of the significant ramifications of a dualistic
epistemology will be described in the next chapter, but for an
adequate definition of dualism it is appropriate at this point
to suggest some of its more obvious implications. First of all
dualism implies transcendence or objective reference. Every
part of the content of' the mind refers to something other than
itself. One’s consciousness of this sheet of paper betokens
not his own conscious states but an object that may have simi-
lar stimulus value for other people. This fact is the key to
Pratt’s theory of meaning. Secondly, dualism emphasizes the
uniqueness of the self. The subject must not be lost, as it
seems to be in monism, by being put on a par with the diversity
of objects. Finally, dualism avoids the stumbling block of
monism, the problem of error. If the content of the mind and
its objects are two distinct facts, there may be discrepancy
and error between them. Furthermore, the account of error
given in dualism implies, in Pratt’s view, the most intelli-
gible and acceptable theory of truth, correspondence.
For a more complete understanding of epistemological
dualism and for a real appreciation of the relation of Pratt’s
personal realism to some of the theories of knowledge which
preceded it, a brief reference to some of the outstanding his-
toric dualisms is apropos.
Until the seventeenth century most philosophers took for
granted the dualism of thought and its object. Aristotle and
his scholastic followers of the middle ages pointed to error.
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memory, and recollection as evidences of dualism. In his
treatise "On Memory and Recollection" Aristotle wrote:
Just as the portrait painted on the panel is "both
a picture and a portrait, and both these are one
and the same thing, yet the actual existence of
the two is not the same thing, and it is possible
to think of it both as a living original and a por-
trait, so in the same way we must regard the mental
picture within us both as a thing for consideration
in itself and as a mental picture of something
else. *7
Similarly the modern representatives of the Aristotelian tradi-
tion, the neo-scholastics who draw their inspiration from
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, assert that both the object and
the mental expression of it must be present in any case of
knowledge.® Descartes, who is often referred to as the father
of modern philosophy because he formulated its main problems,
likewise assumed epistemological dualism:
Ne proposant de traiter icy de la Lumidre, la
premidre chose dont je veux vous avert ir, est,
qu*il peut y avoir de la difference entre le senti-
ment que nous en avons, c^est k dire l*ld^e qul
s*en forme en nostre imagination par I’entremlse
de nos yeux, & ce qui est dans les objets qui
produit en nous sentiment, c'est k dire ce qui est
dans la fl^me ou dans le Soleil, qui s*appelle du
nom de Lumiere.^
The appearance of Lockers revolutionary theory of know-
ledge in the seventeenth century rudely shocked the widely ac-
cepted theory of dualism. For Lockers effort to formulate an
7 Aristotle, RN, 450b.
® Cf. NoSl, P6IC, 614-15, 617-19.
^ Adam and Tannery, DO, XI, 3. Cf. Pratt, ECR, 85-88.
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empirical and realistic epistemology resulted in the agnostic
conclusion that the mind can refer only to its own mental con-
tent, its ideas* Locke asserted that knowledge "is real only
in so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the
reality of things, This suggests that in every case of
knowledge there are two elements, the content of the mind and
the object* These elements cannot be eliminated by being re-
duced to one another* But Locke further asked -- and here*s
the rub — "How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but
its own ideas, know that they agree with things thems elves
His answer was that simple ideas are not fictions because
patently they are produced by things* Such simple ideas as
whiteness or bitterness are plainly in conformity with external
objects* And complex ideas (except substances) cannot be fic-
tions because they are not referred to things* This is the
case with mathematical and moral ideas* Locke here suggested
the haunting problem of modern philosophy -- How avoid agnosti-
cism which dualism implies and how get beyond contented solip-
sism and the "iron ring of ideas?" As might be expected, mod-
ern philosophy has reached no uniform and conclusive solution
for this problem. The very existence of Pratt’s dualistic per-
sonal realism is specific evidence that no solution has been
attained, for his philosophy is a reaction to views he charact-
erizes as epistemological monism.
10 Locke, LCHU, 378* Of. 378-79.
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A few words about the genesis of dualistic personal
realism will show quite clearly that it is an effort to defend
the thesis of epistemological dualism against certain monistic
tendencies. In the eyes of new and critical realism idealism
has made its way out of the dilemma suggested by Locke through
subjectivism. It is no tragedy that man can know nothing but
his ideas, for the world is such stuff as ideas are made of.^^
Idealism, the realists agree, has capitalized the ego-centric
predicament and committed the fallacy of initial predication.
Its subjectivism has destroyed the distinction between the con-
tent of the mind and its object, for thought is regarded as
creating or constituting its object
Modern realism began as an attack on this conception of
Idealism. The first shot was fired in Jingland in 1903 by Mr.
G. E. Moore. Soon the English new realists developed the basic
theses of Moore’s "The Refutation of idealism." They believed
that the entire content of mind -- sensa, percepts, and con-
cepts — are physical. Thus they reverted to a position simi'
lar to naive realism in which perception ana knowledge are im-
mediate. In the American scene William James may be said to be
responsible for pragmatism, neorealism, and critical realism.
These three schools make a "philosophic assertion of the most
11 Of. Perry, Art. 1, 446-51; Harlow, BAR, 29-31; Pratt, PR,
169; Pratt, ECR, 88-89.
Cf. Perry, Art. 1, 450-51; Pratt, ECR, 88-89.
1^ Cf. Moore, PS, 23-24; Pratt, RR, 39-44.
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general assumption of all naive experience, to-wit that the
world we experience is real and independent of our knowledge of
it."^*^ Whereas the English new realists started c t with a
theory of knowledge which was frankly monistic, American neo-
realists at first defended a dualistic epistemology. Later the^
abandoned this position. "A Program and First Platform of Six
Realists" which appeared in 1910, proposed that cognition he re-
garded as just another relation and that there is no basic di-
chotimy between subject and object. The content of knowledge
is the thing known, so knowledge of things is imm.ediate.^^ Neo-
realism continued its attack on idealism, which it viev/ed as
disguised subjectivism, but now with a monistic epistemology.
This tack was far from satisfactory for all realists. Some of
the older sympathizers with neorealism saw that its monistic
epistemology was bound to lead to serious difficulties in the
problem of error and perception.
In December, 1916 after acquaintances had been made at
the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association,
there began a co-operative effort similar to that of the neo-
realists but alm.ed at refuting their epistemology. Seven men
(Drake, Pratt, Love joy, Rogers, Sellars, Strong, and Santayana)
began work on a joint product which appeared four years later
as Essays in Critical Realism. The critical realists accepted
Harlow, BAR, 2-3.
Cf. Perry, NR, 31-5. "A Program and First Platform of Six
Realists" first appeared in Journal of Philosophy in 1910.
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the general thesis of realism hut further insisted, as against
the neorealists, that knowledge is always representative and in-
direct, an interpretation of something other than itself,
Critical realism is thus dualistic realism*
Since the publication of Es says in Critical Realism in
1920 some of the contributors have changed their views. Pratt
has found it necessary to part company with some of his erst-
while colleagues for he felt that the naturalistic conclusions
drawn from critical realism were not justifiable* Critical
realism, rather than pointing to naturalism, for Pratt seems ’*to
lead ultimately to a conception of the partial independence and
spontaneity of the mind and of the reality of a substantial
self*"l'7 Pratt has come to personal realism which aims to de-
fend both realism and the actuality of the self* As early as
1922 he referred to his philosophy as personal realism. He in-
sisted it is frankly and thoroughly dualistic, it applies the
method of science wherever it is applicable, it employs an in-
tuitive empirical method in the realm of spirit, and it is
soundly based on a dualistic epistemology*^®
The various strains of thought and intellectual tradi-
tions to which Pratt has been exposed .have woven themselves in-
to his philosophical views* Aside from the influence of a
16 Cf. Harlow, BAR, 73-75; Pratt, ECR, 88-9, 105; MS, 105-11*
Pratt, PR, viii. Cf* Pratt, RR, 53-4; Zeerleder, Art* 1,
904-5.
Pratt, PR, 6-9*
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Scotch Protestant background and the ideas of his philosophy
teacher at Williams College, philosophy had no strong bearing
on Pratt’s thinking until he undertook graduate work at Harvard
University, 1898-99,*^ There he was torn between opposing
forces, between the realistic pluralism of William James and the
idealistic monism of Royce and Palmer, While James was away
during Pratt’s last year at Harvard, he felt the lure of ideal-
ism, and in his early years at Williams he was a foe of pragma-
tism.^*^ In What Is Pragmatism? Pratt attacked James, He was
trying earnestly to be an idealist. But the Influence and les-
sons of James were still too strong. Realistic epistemology
seemed more probable than idealistic, but Pratt could not sub-
scribe to any form of new realism. In the end he came to the
dualistic realism described above as the most probable hypothe-
sis and the means of avoiding impossible positions
,
Pratt’s present views reveal at many points the ingredi-
|
ents which went into their making. His emphasis on empirical '
method, his insistence on metaphysical pluralism, and his de-
finition of the real as that which makes a difference to experi-
ence reveal the impress of William James, On the other hand,
his references to the cosmos as an organic process of inter-
19 Cf, Pratt, CAP, II, 213-15,
Of his alliance with pragmatism Pratt writes: "I had never
been able to go all the way with his {.James ’sj Pragmatism, and
the anti-intellectualism which under his leadership and that of
Dewey and Schiller carried so large a part of the philosophical
world with it in the first decade of this century seemed to
me to be perilous for the life of mund.” Pratt, CAP, II, 214-15,
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related reals and his defenses of spiritual pantheism, personal
idealism, and absolute idealism betray the lingering influence
j
I
of Royce and Palmer. Those references also show the effect of
Pratt’s deep interest in oriental religions. While he has been
developing his personal realism, the undertones of the Upani-
shads and the monistic idealism of Vedanta and Mahayana have
not been out of hearing. They have held a charm for him in
spite of his pluralism.^^
C. Brief historical interpretation of the problem.
One of the methods proposed earlier in this chapter was
historical criticism. In this investigation such a method is
especially concerned with the meaning and importance of the
nonrational factor in relation to historic Issues and ideas.
This method should be applied in a general way to the central
problem of this investigation.
With what persistent problems of philosophy is the prob-
lem of the nonrational factor related? First of all, it is re-
lated to the problem of the place of the empirically given or
sensation in knowledge. Pratt positively defines the nonration
al factor as the given brute fact of unreasoning perception®^^
21 Cf. Pratt, CAP, II, 217-19; PR, 377-81
Cf, Pratt, PR, 51-2, 55, 58.
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It is just this element with which rationalists refuse to deal*
For rationalism is, according to Pratt, nothing hut a kind of
cosFxic logic, an elaborate structure of concepts with no place
for brute fact. The problem of the nonrat ional factor reopens
the issue of rationalism vs. empiricism. It calls for another
effort to make the synthesis at which Kant aimed.
Secondly, the problem of the nonrat ional factor is re-
lated to the metaphysical problem of contingency. The strong
influence of William James is still felt by Pratt who continues
the fight against an ultra-rationalistic block-universe in
0*7
favor of pluralism of a sort. The cosmos of the extreme
rationalists is, according to Pratt, an artificial structure
built only with logic and concepts and allowing no place for thei
brute facts or nonrational elements with which philosophy must
deal
.
Aside from these problems to which the nonrational fac-
tor is related there are several important metaphysical topics
on which it has a bearing. Since Pratt argues that the mark
of an existent is its givenness, "thatness," or nonrational ele-
ment, the main problem of this investigation is directly con-
cerned with the definition of being or substance. Consequently
it reopens perennial questions concerning the ultimate character
of physical things and the soul. Since Pratt locates unlversals
and concepts and laws in a sphere opposed to that of existents.
23 cf. Pratt, PR, 61-2, 373.
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CHAPTER II
THE BASIS OF THE ASSERTION OF A NONRATIONAL FACTOR
A, Epistemological dualism,
Pratt’s theory of knowledge is dualistic or critical real-
ism, He argues that in every case of knowledge there is an
existential difference between the contents of the mind and its
objects which may be physical things in the materialistic sense
or as interpreted by panpsychism, other centers of conscious-
ness, logical entities, or essences. In other words, knowledge
is always indirect and representative. It involves references
to objects which are other than mental content. Furthermore,
Pratt asserts that "not two but at least three factors are in-
volved in the knowledge situation: namely, the conscious sub-
ject, the mental content, and the object (whether epistemologi-
cal or ontological)."^
1, Theory of Meaning.
The theory of meaning as representation or pointing for
which Pratt is a strong partisan fits neatly into his epistemo-
logical dualism. Such a theory of meaning, moreover, shows the
need of asserting a nonrat ional factor.
^ Pratt PR, 193. See also; Pratt, ECR, 88-89, 105; Harlow,
BAR, 73-75,

18
The alternatives to the theory of meaning as pointing or
representation are unsatisfactory for one reason or another.
The view which makes meaning synonymous with relation expresses
the half truth that every meaning is a relation or relational
quality, hut every relation is not a meaning. If a thing means
the infinity of other things to which it is related, the term
becomes useless. Again, the psychological definition of mean-
ing as context (When one mental process is the context of an-
other, it is its meaning. ) would seem to limit meaning to sub-
jective mental processes and thus make communication between
persons impossible. The failure of this definition to admit
any objectivity in meaning reduces it to a form of solipsism.
Another definition would find the meaning of anything in all the
propositions which can be deduced from an assertion about it.
This definition, like the first, would give the term such an in-
finite extension that it would be useless.^
To escape the perils of these vague and inexact defini-
tions of meaning Pratt turns to the common sense use of the
term. Meaning is synonymous with the ordinary everyday experi-
ence of pointing. It involves an outer reference which may be
direct or may employ symbols. A personal mind can refer to or
mean something directly, but only symbols can actualHyhave
meaning, e. g. only symbols -- words, pictures, smells, and be-
havior -- can act as representatives. This common use of the
2 Of. Pratt, PR, 11-15.
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word meaning suggests the definition which Pratt accepts. He
I
further points out that every Instance of meaning involves:
"(1) the sign or symbol or representative, (2) the object
*m.eant* which we shall call the referend, and (3) the active,
|
I
conscious process which is aware of what the symbol refers to.’^
Symbols may be divided into two classes: public and pri-
!
vate symbols. The former are the gestures and sounds used by
any group of persons to make communication possible within the
group. The latter are those words and visual, auditory, or
kinaesthetic images which may be used by an individual in his
private mental processes as well as in communication. The im-
portant characteristic of s^rmbols is that they are the means
' whereby persons refer to objects. They are the instruments of
thought. Symbols acquire their representative quality or mean-
ing through experience in which habits and association link the
symbol with that to which it refers. But meaning is more than
a matter of conditioned reflexes. Although the source of all
meaning which a symbol may possess is experience, a symbol is
the means of a conscious activity of referring.
Since every case of meaning is a conscious reference or
pointing to something by means of symbols, it involves personal
activity and transcendence. Those who fall to see meaning as
pointing or referring and regard it as only a matter of context
are not aware of the difference between the object and content
I
^ Pratt, PR, 15. See also: Pratt, CAP, II, 216; Pratt, Art, 7,
187.
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of thought. Every case of meaning is an objective reference, a
||
reference to an object which is not intended to be existential- i;
ly identical with any part of the content of the mind.^ The men-
j,
I C
i tal datum always has a conscious outer reference.'^ This process
I
further implies the conscious intention of a person. Whatever
^ meaning those unconscious things which are used as symbols may
|
I
have is derived from their relation to conscious beings or per-
sons#^
The symbols in the act of meaning and the active process
' of referring have been discussed, but there has been no ex-
i tended consideration of the object referred to, the referend.
The referend may be a thing, quality, or any possible object
which the symbol denotes or to which it points. But meaning
does not necessarily involve connotation so the referend itself
need not have meaning. This is not to assert that objects,
events, and things are characterless.
I Things can very well have character without meaning any-
thing. It is only symbols upon which the possession of
meaning is Incumbent. And surely there a great many
things on heaven and earth besides symbols.V
4 The contents of the mind always refer to objects. A conscious
person does not perceive his perceptions. His perceptions and
conceptions are only the tools whereby he gets to objects. Pratt
clarifies objective reference by an Illustration: "When I have
in my mind a concept or memory image of my friend — I am not
thinking the thought of my friend. I am thinking of him.... To
have a concept of him is to think of him." Pratt, Art. 7, 182.
Cf. Pratt, RR, 38.
5 Of. Pratt, ECR, 91; Brightman, Art. 3, 133-34.
® Cf. Pratt, PR, 21-22.
V Ibid., 18.

From the psychological fact of pointing or objective re-
ference Pratt draws some conclusions about the character of the
object or referend* First of all, only symbols, which alone
can have meaning, are definable: "It is only symbols and never
things that are defined,"® As a corollary, any thing can exist
as real even if it is indefinable provided it has character
which allows it to be a referend. Definition clarifies the sym-
bols but not the things to which they refer. In fact definitior
itself finally goes backto the indefinable, to that "which must
be known, if at all, by immediate awareness,"® In the last ana-
lysis, then, every case of meaning involves a nonratlonal fac-
tor as that which is presupposed in the definitions of symbols.
It presupposes the directly experienced or merely given. The
fact that only symbols may be defined or rationalized in no way
precludes the existence or reality of the thing symbolized even
if it is outside the order or rationality,
2, The Nature of Truth and Knowledge,
Pratt’s view of meaning as pointing, representing, or
denoting the object is really part of his theory of knowledge.
It ascribes to symbols meaning, definability, and knowability.
It is rooted in the kernel of his epistemology, the experienced
fact of transcendence or objective reference. Of this relation
8 Pratt, PR, 23.
9 Ibid., 23.
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Pratt says, "For him[_C* I, Lewlsj as for me transcendence of '
' the immediately given is essential to both knowledge and mean- |
ing,..* Knowledge and meaning are not identical,.,. Imagination '
1
]
'' is essential to meaning and ample to produce it."^^ In fact '
I
I
I
Pratt’s definition of knowledge follows from the nature of mean4
ing as he has described it.^^ For Plato’s "admirable" deflni-
|
ji
tion of knowledge as true opinion with reason involves objectiv^j
i
reference. Opinion is always about something, a reference to
j
something beyond present experience. Like \7heelwright Pratt jl
i|
makes self-transcendence or objective reference an epistemologi-*'
li
i
cal category inasmuch as it is presupposed in every instance of i,
knowledge,^^ The formal condition of significance. Wheelwright j
I
1
argues, is self-transcendence which is universal for cognition,
|
Objective reference in knowledge means that the present
!
I
subjective mental content, the symbols, are used to refer to i
I
something other than themselves. It is "an active referring be-f
I
t
I yond the psychological given. This active process of refer-
j
I
II
ji
I ring is an implicit judgment, which, if made articulate, be-
jj
i
! comes an explicit judgment. So every case of knowledge is a |
I i<
j
judgment in which a subject refers to an object. In that judg-
jj
! I
10 Pratt, Arto 13, 706,
j11 Of. Pratt, PR, 87.
1
12 Cf, ibid,, 49-50. I
Cf, Brightman, P6IC, 123,
j
!
Pratt, PR, 89. Cf. Pratt, ECR, 91-95; WIP, 137-40; CAP, II, 1

!l 23*
I
merit transcends the present mental content, knowledge is always
|
i
representative and indirect* It represents or is about some- i
thing other than mental process, something external to the mind :
i
1 c
of the subject making the judgment Pratt concludes that there
are at least three factors in every case of knowing: "najnely,
j
1
I
the conscious subject, the mental content, and the object I
(whether epistemological or ontological)
,
|
i
Pratt’s theory of knowledge does not, hov/ever, stay on
|
the purely formal level described above* He soon passes from a
i
consideration of the bare relations in the knowledge situation
!
1
I
, to analysis of its three elements and to a metaphysical char- i
I
l!
I acterization of those elements. First of all, "judging, know-
||
'
- 1
I
ing, and meaning, all outer reference imply the reality of the !
I
I
subject or self*"^*^ Perception, recognition, and thought force
!
i
the conclusion that the self is more than a logical presupposi-
tion, as many Kant ians argue*^® It is an existent entity akin
I
I
to the pure ego of traditional philosophy, says Pratt* It is a
I
*
I
substance of its own kind and has a nonrational element just as
1 does every existing thing* A more definitive analysis of the ^
I
j
self in Pratt’s dualism is to be found in the following chapter
|
: I
: on "The Metaphysical Significance of the Nonrational Factor *
" j
cf* Pratt, PR, 192-93* Brlghtman, Art* 1, 267*
;
15 Pratt, PR, 193.
I
17 Ibid., 92.
18 Cf. ibid., 288-89.
I
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There Pratt *s view of the self will be tied up with other as-
jj
pects of his philosophy, including his epistemology, '|
The second of the three main elements in knowledge is thej!
mental content or what one would find by introspection — sensa,
'I
images, effort, and the processes of perception. 20 The objects
to which one refers or about which one judges in knowledge are j:
jj
not to be Identified with this mental content. The character 'j
ii
I
of this aspect of knowledge can be made clearer by a descriptiori
: I,
of the objects to which one refers in judging and knowing. Since;
the mind can transcend its content, since it means more than its|
1
"Intimate furniture," it may have logical or existent referends.j
The former, the epistemological objects, are "logical entities,
,
!|
definable natures, universals, essences. "21 The epistemological 1
r
object is the given datum which is not to be identified with
;
1
the psychological content discoverable by introspection. Rather n
i|
it is the logical essence of the real thing. Hence the asser- j'
'I
tlon that "nothing given exists." For the epistemological oh-
'I
ject as the given datum, the essence, is not an existent. It is
' only the definable nature or characterization of an existent.
j
!
Or, as Pratt says, the epistemological object characterizes the ;
ipp
ontological object. Knowledge, then, is always indirect or
j
I
19 Cf, especially 53 where the inference of a "substantial self’jj
from transcendence is criticized,
i
!
Cf, Pratt, PR, 195.
|
21 Of, ibid., 197 and 191, 199, 205; ECR, 223.
|
22 Cf. ibid., 205.
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.
knowledpre about an ontological object which is "not a part of i
the subject's conscious content.
|
t
The ontological object, as it has been suggested, is an
j
i
existent entity or substance whose "whatness" or definable '!
nature is exhausted by the epistemological object or essence.
The way in which every existent is a unity of "whatness" and '
"thatness" or the relation of essence to existence will be dis- !
i
cussed more fully in the next chapter for it is really a meta-
jj
physical issue rather than a formal epistemological question.
j
No discussion of epistemological issues is complete with-j
II
out some reference to the conditions of knowledge, without an
j
I
examination of m.an’s intellectual faculties. "It has been a '
commonplace of philosophy for over two thousand years," says
Pratt, "that knowledge, especially in this sense of a system of
i
propositions is dependent for its nature not only upon the *real{
world* of the realist, but also upon us and our powers of per-
ception and conception. It is Pratt's contention as a real-
|
1st that man's intellectual equipment conditions the object m ji
knowledge -- the epistem ological object described above -- but j
II
does not affect the object £f knowledge. In other words, the
||
form of the revelation of an independently real world is de- I
pendent on the nature of man's cognitive apparatus.
j
23 Pratt, PR, 205. • ij
t
Ibid., 93.
!
I
I
I
I
I
i|
l|
I

Pratt thinks Kant has given a truistic and obvious ex-
planation of the relation of knowledge to its subjective condi- ii
ii
tions. The truth of Kantian idealism is "that our concepts of
reality are dependent on our powers of conception, "25 <phe fact
;i
that everything which goes into science is categorized and giverij
a certain order by the operations of the understanding means
{j
I
that man’s world is largely determined by his Intellectual
j
i
I equipment. Thus the necessary conditions of thought give a cer-*
tain amount of a priori knowledge about the real world. This a
priori knowledge is the system of laws or principles man must
employ if any knowledge is to be possible. It consists of the
three fundamental laws of thought or logical categories laid
down by Aristotle without which any discussion or simple af-
firmation is impossible. It may also be said to embrace a sys-
tem of epistemological categories -- consciousness, subject-
object relation, transcendence, and self — and a system of
metaphysical categories — things, relations, order, space and
time, quality, existency, substance, motion, and others,^®
These categories show that the nature of knowledge rests on the !
t
l,
fact that man must think about the real in certain ways, Man’s 1*
powers of conception and perception determine the form his know-i|
ledge will take, they determine the world for him but not the
world as it is in itself, "The conditions of knowledge," says
I
25 Pratt, PR, 94,
26 In this list of categories Pratt follows Alexander and
Sellars, Cf, Pratt, PR, 47-50,

fratt, "are not the conditions of Reality, hut they are the con-
ditions of science and philosophy.
It would seem that the upshot of Pratt’s conception of
1
the conditions of knowledge is an assertion of agnosticism. In
|l
distinguishing between the world as it is and as it is for man, jl
|i
i'
between the object in knowledge and the object of knov/ledge
I which is not affected, Pratt has shut himself up in the "iron
j,
i
jj
[
ring of ideas" and made the real world an unknowable thing in
1)
I
itself. But as it was pointed out above, it is possible to get ‘1
1
beyond the "iron ring of ideas" or content of the mind because
j
I !
j
the mind transcends its own content and makes references to ob- '
I jects. In knowledge there is a reference to objects which are
[{
i
‘I
j
not a part of the subject’s mental content. Because knowledge
|j
is always indirect and mediate, the intrinsic nature of inde-
jj
II
pendent objects cannot be known, but the epistemological objectsj!
i
-- definable natures, qualities, essences -- may chaiacterize thel
existent or ontological object*
Since Pratt thinks of knowledge as the characterization
(
of an existent or ontological object by the epistemological ob-
I
ject which is an essence or logical nature, it would seem, if he
I
1
is to be consistent, that knowledge must also imply a nonrat ion-jj
al factor. For the ontological object is always beyond its de-
I
finable nature. "The givenness of the existent is not a defln- '
\
able quality and hence. . .there is in existence a nonratlonal '
Pratt, PR, 97. !
i;
i
I
i
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but purely empirical element*”^® Since the distinction be- i
tween the epistemological and ontological object in the know-
I
ledge situation is equivalent to the difference between essence
|j
and existence, it would seem to follov; that a discussion of the i|
ji
elements of knowledge must make reference to the nonrational ij
il
j!
factor in connection with the ontological object. The whole ji
matter is not so simple as that, however. In characterizing
|
I
the eoistemologlcal and ontological objects as essences and ex-
|
I
istents the discussion is transferred from the level of purely
,
i
I
formal epistemological distinctions to an ontological theory. i
I
This conclusion from Pratt’s epistemological theory is
j
I
a very fertile source of theoretical ambiguity and confusion. 'I
For examnle, in the discussion of dualistic realism Pratt as- :i
ii
serts that "the existent object can never be given directly, ii
ji
and so must always remain hypothetical and unknown. "29 Again,
I
in his epistemological theory Pratt asserts with Santayana ‘
"Nothing given exists." Only the epistemological object or
datum, which is not an existent, is given. let, in distinguii>'
I
Ing between existence and essence he speaks of the "givenness" J
'Z'l I
of the existent The only coherent v/ay in which a nonration- ii
I
al or purely empirical element can fit into Pratt’s epistemo-
Pratt, PR, 58.
2^ Ibid., 206.
30 Cf. ibid., 200.
31 Cf. ibid., 52-53, 58.
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logy is as part of the subjective mental content which is knovm |i
directly and immediately by ’’acquaintance with," This tactic
can reconcile the conflicting statements about the imknown,
hypothetical character of existents with their givennes. Only
f
I;
the immediate present complex of consciousness can be said to
|
be ’’given,” Everything else — objects or existents, other per-|
sons, and even one’s own body -- is an inference from this com- !
pletely empirical situation, Existents are always hypothetical I
ii
entities. If such a position is taken, however, Pratt’s dis- 'j
!i
tinction between the mental content and epistemological objects !|
'j
must be reinterpreted. Epistemological objects or essences are
!
abstractions from a past empirical situation or given complex
of consciousness which are apprehended directly by the present
conscious content. In reference to this present conscious con-
i:
tent both epistemological obiects and ontological objects must i
be said to belong to the general class of hypothetical entitles*'
"
!|
There are then two rather than three general elements in the I,
knowledge situation: the present given content of consciousness
|
and the abstract (essences) or coherent (existents) hypotheti-
j
cal entities Inferred from it. Such an interpretation of the
eplstemlc situation threatens Pratt’s "substantial self," But
that threat has already been mentioned in connection with his
inference of a "substantial self" from transcendence,^^
32 Cf. Brightman, Art, 3, 133-35,
33 Cf, 23-24,
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There is another criticism which should he made of '
Pratt*s dualistic realism. Pratt tires to avoid agnosticism to
|
j!
which dualism may lead hy insisting that the fact of transcend-
j
ence or objective reference means that the idea genuinely char-
acterizes its object. So part of the time he seem.s to argue
that essences or epistemological objects are inseparable from
and genuinely a part of the real. Often his thought takes an
agnostic turn, as was shown above, when he urges that the in- Ij
>1
I
trinsic qualities of any object are untouched by the characteriH
zation of essence, for the epistemological object is only a de-
finable nature or quality having a "merely logical status." If
||
the claim of transcendence or objective reference is to be jl
given any support, there must be some way of determining whetherl
!
the hypothetical existents to which the contents of conscious-
j
I
ness refer are well enough established to be regarded as "ob-
Ijective." There must be some court of appeal for deciding
j
ij
whether or not "epistemological objects" truly characterize
I
"ontological objects." That court of appeal must be a coherent
,
experience which takes cognizance of the strictly logical or
j
rational part of experience as well as the empirical and non-
j
rational. In a coherent experience the immediate qualitative
|
aspects of consciousness are interpreted and given rational
j
I
I
form. The mere fact of transcendence does not completely justi-j
fy its claims and once and for all annihilate agnosticism.^^ !'
i|
II
Ralph Barton Perry has sensed the difficulties in such a !i
dualism as Pratt offers. The insistence that knowledge is about
things other than itself, says Perry, gives rise to a thing in

31
.
Pratt’s theory of truth, like his theories of meaning and;'
l!
knowledge, points to a nonrational factor. Moreover, it har-
monizes with his definition of meaning as pointing and with
i!
dualistic realism. As against a conception of truth as coher-
ence or workability Pratt defines truth as correspondence.
jj
The coherence theory of "severe rationalism" defines {i
i!
truth, Pratt asserts, as self-consistency within the total logi-|j
•I
cal scheme or system of propositions and concepts. This d.efini-|'
I
tion signifies the rationalist’s belief that there is nothing
j
in the world but essences -- definable natures, logical entities,;
and apprehendec. qualities -- for it takes no cognizance of the
realm of existence or brute fact. According to Pratt extreme
rationalists "think only in terms of the realm of essence and
actually refuse to acknowledge the reality or significance of
/Z C
existence and the given.’^'^ Such a view may satisfy those who
regard philosophy as nothing more than "cosmic logic" but is
hardly acceptable to Pratt who believes that philosophy must be
itself which is always other than the content of knowledge. Theri|
"all qualities and characters, in so far as known, are annexed ij
by knowledge and withdrawn from reality Linto Pratt’s epistemo- !
logical object^*" The object is reduced to a bare x. But if
{knowledge can only point to a reality it can never grasp, it is J
a failure. Of. Perry, PPT, 311; Montague, WK, •'^?9-31. The way l|
out of this dilemma seems to be to recognize- transcendence as a
formal epistemological fact. But from the fact of transcend-
ence one cannot demonstrate the object’s independence of know-
ledge and consciousness. Man cannot get out of the "iron ring
of ideas" or the realm of epistemological objects by any posi-
tively certain demonstration. By believing in the trustworthl- I;
ness of reason and memory and by persistent testing of his in- |i
ferences in terms of a coherent experience he can establish ij
their objectivity.
ij
.1
35 Pratt, PR, 75.
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concerned with more than definable natures, relations, and
(
logical necessity*
i
The pragmatic doctrine defines truth as workability. "A i|
jj
true proposition is one that works. But the workability to
!j
which the pragmatist appeals is, according to Pratt, consist- 'j
ency. "The true proposition is one that works together with ex-
perience and with one’s other accepted judgments and belief s
.
ji
So pragmatism is very close to the rationalistic view that truttj!
is coherence or consistency within the general system of judg-
ments, and like the coherence theory of truth it neglects ex-
istent things I
In preference to the tenets of pragmatism and' "extreme
rationalism" Pratt defines truth as "the quality of trueness
which a proposition has in virtue of the fact that its object
actually is of the nature which the proposition asserts."^® A
judgment is a true one if what it is talking about is consti-
tuted as the judgment asserts it to be. This does not oppose
realism to idealism for it involves no consideration of the
nature of physical reality. Nor is it a theory of copying, as jl
i
it has often been caricatured, in which mental images copy ex-
|
ternal things. It merely asserts that the object, regardless
[j
of what kind it is, is as the judgment asserts it to be. It is
||
36 Pratt, PR, 84. Cf. Pratt, Art. 1, 131.
3V Pratt, PR, 84.
^6 Ibid., 80. Cf. also Pratt, ECR, 99; WIP, 65-6V. i
I
i!
it

33 .
the statement of a relation which holds whether or not it is
known or verified. To assert that this relation cannot he veri-|
fied because there is no way of testing the correspondence is,
according to Pratt, to confuse the definition of truth with the
!
process of verifying it. In fact coherence is the most imnort-
ij
ant test of truth. A true judgment is one which is self-consist4
1
ent and consistent with the total system of judgments. In the
I
realm of essence, logic, and mathems.tics the criterion of truth h
may be equivalent to the meaning of truth. But in dealing with !l
the existential world which is not exhausted by reasoning and li
definitions and which cannot be reduced to the knowledge of it,
j!
coherence is the, test rather than the definition of truth.
The correspondence theory of truth gives access to the
I
i
realm of existence. It presupposes that the "judgment of an
individual may refer to objects outside itself. In his the-
ory of meaning Pratt concluded that the referend need not have
meaning nor can the objects to which judgments refer be de-
fined. Only symbols have meaning, and only symbols can be de-
fined. Thus, the referend in any judgment may be indefinable
or merely given. Similarly, the correspondence theory of truth
has room for judgments whose referend is more than a logical
entity or essence. The correspondence theory takes cognizance
of exi stents which, as will be shown later, are always more thari
essences and Involve a mere datum or nonrational factor.
39 Pratt, PR, 82,

B« Terms and Relations
There is anotiaer aspect of Pratt’s philosophy which
'I
forms the "basis of asserting a nonrational factor: the theory
of terms and relations. The definition of relations and the
j
description of the connection of terms and relations is one of
j
the most perplexing pro"blems of philosophy. If it is not dis-
|
I
posed of in epistemological theory, it can generate enough dia-
j
I
lectical difficulty to redirect the whole line of argument.
j
That is just what it did for Bradley who concluded:
j:
I
A relational way of thought -- any one that moves hy
j
the machinery of terms and relations -- must give ap-
j
pearance, and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, I
a m.ere practical compromise, m.ost necessary but in |
the end most indefensible. Our intellect, then, has 1
been condemned to confusion and bankruptcy, and the
reality has been left outside uncomprehended.40 j
I
I
Bradley’s difficulty with this problem is typical. He
conceived of relation as a kind of link or tie which binds
I
terms together. By overlooking the fact that relations relate
he stumbled on the question of how relate the relation. He had
I
turned the relation into a term.41
j
i;
i
Although Kant apnroached the problem from an entirely j;
ji
different angle, the point of view of epistemological theory, |
!'
his solution, according to Pratt, is not without its ambiguity. '
j|
Kant thought of relations as categories or functions of the k
li
I
40 Bradley, AR, 33.
41 Cf. Pratt, PR, 32

understanding^^ which make experience ( Erfahrung ) possible
For Pratt this amounts to saying that "Relations are the work
of the mind."^"^ And he finds as little enlightenment here as in \
\\
Royce^s definition of relation as a character which a term gets
jj
by being a member of a group. Royce uses "term" in its own de-
j|
finition as is suggested by the word "group" which presupposes
'j
I!
relation. ii
IIn view of these difficulties Pratt thinks that rela- 1
I
I
tions, because they are ultimately simple, are incapable of de- '
finition by analysis. As referends in many common judgments,
j
!|
however, they possess character that is found in experience. I
I
!
There one finds terms in groups and finds their character modi-
j
i
fied by other terms. "Thus though we cannot define relation,"
|
j
Pratt says, "we can exhibit it."^^
1
There are two general conceptions of relations: internal
||
i!
and external relations. The former get inside of and qualify or'
j!
constitute the terms. This is the stand of extreme rationalism^!
[1
Pratt thinks it amounts to saying that all qualities are rela- ji
tional and that there are no intrinsic or inherent qualities. I
il
1
It Implies that the world is a logical structure in which the
i
.
quality of everything therein is derived from its relation to |
i li
42 cf. Kant, KrV, A79-80, B105.
j
li
43 Cf. ibid., A128, B167. i|
li
44 Pratt, PR, 51.
I
I
45 Ibid., 33.
||
I
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other things. But It ignores the fact that relations pre-
suppose relata which must have an independent status In ad'
dition to the experience of groups there is the experience of [
i|
the intrinsic qualities of a thing. Things are apprehended as
j
I
possessing an inherent quale . Pratt further argues that if re-i
lations were only internal, causality, for example, would he re-|
Iduced to a necessary logical relation which can be discovered i
1
by deduction. If terms have no inherent quality, every event
!j
ij
entails every other in accordance with the Law of Identity. '^8
!;
IIIn the alternative view, external relations, the re la- i
ll
tions are connections between terms which have intrinsic quali-
|j
ties of their own. This is a characteristic tenet of empiric-
j
ism.^^ As a part of the general realistic hypothesis it is an
assertion that a thing may be related to another thing yet not jl
depend on that thing for its existence. It is the assertion
|[
I
that a thing (or term) is not constituted by its relations with 1
other things for it has its own intrinsic qualities. To take
|
i
this position is not to argue that there are absolutely unre-
j|
|i
lated terms but only that terms have some character which is I
I
not dependent on their locus in a pattern or group. Just as
|
one’s experience shows that things are different because they
j
46 Cf. Pratt, PR, 27.
|
47 Cf. ibid., 28.
|
48 Cf. ibid., 121-22.
49 Cf. ibid., 121. '|

! are rart of a group, it also reveals through "acquaintance with"j
!
I
I
I
or immediate apprehension the intrinsic and indefinable char-
J|
ij
acter of a thing.
jj
I
Pratt will entertain neither of these alternative con- !
ceptions of relations in its extreme form. The extremes must be|
I
modified by a recognition that relations are both external and
|
I i
I
internal, for things actually have relational characters given
j
I
I
j
in the knowledge of them and intrinsic qualities which are di- ji
i
! rectly experienced. In other words, relations modify and con-
j
I
I
I stltute terms which nevertheless have characters of their own. !
I
I
The relational characters of things apprehended in knowledge,
j
however, are most important because they make practical and
scientific activity possible. This is another way of asserting
that the world is more than a thoroughly rational structure in
which every event entails every other in accordance with the
i
laws of logic. It is an assertion that relations presuppose re-!
lata which have an immediate, inherent, and indefinable quale
or nonratlonal factor.
Pratt ’ s "definition" of relations is clearly a basis for
asserting a nonratlonal factor. However, it raises a number of
j
questions. Has Pratt really defined either relations or terms? *!
i If one takes his y/ord that definition Involves analysis, the
||
1
ij
j
answer must be no. Relations are reduced to analysis-defying
J
simples that can only be exhibited or experienced. Whatever
Cf. Pratt, PR, 32-33.
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individuality terms may have can be apprehended by "acquaintanc^i
with" their iiranediate inherent quality or datum. Whatever ther^'
i!
is in terms that is more than immediate experience are indefin- l!
II
II
: able relational qualities I Is this not a really barren empiric-^^
ism? And if knowledge is always mediate and representative, !
does this attempted definition of relations and terms place
both in the class of unknowables? Apparently it does,
i The discussion of terms and relations contains some
I
i
significant suggestions concerning the m.etaphysical importance
ij
l|
of the nonrational factor. The recognition that there are
j|
I
M
things in the v;orld not entirely constituted by their relations tl
!!
means the world is more than a tight structure everywhere knit-
ted together by logical implication. Hence, the admission of a l!
li
nonrational factor makes provision for contingency in the uni- |i
j
verse as will be shown more fully in the following chapter.
!
3i :'i .tit•t r-..l lit':-'' -•
ild::
"'ii -.IK c;-
:-
3 Cf rffso ~'V^'ii si.'L.ti 7 ^ ' -i i v' ('hr:
t
;r-^' •: ; ; ii j^;7p •> 7 ' il k 'i.k' ' . r/ J ''j'k'xVT
- :M': :j:! i 7 0' r=>7'r' p.I err?-' .'-
;t‘3'K 'jX^- )v '? Xc,:-’: a..'.;,:; aT ! sa.I ' kj. .. I .; . 0 .* ;•»'' -'a
.
:••-.
; :vv a*,; - t i: eXv.:; a :j Vise*
i .triif" J .!;.; a -sik; ' q.a; t>-T ‘19 7c i:;i * a . . b\. e tr > cjau
:* t a\?rv..jyiii7j X.7 sea/o rr/ 7 .;.':'’
S'K-'S Ri;ia:L7-3o an Mwi '.'
1
ha£ o-t:7' "i lo ,n«v./a:;i^0o i.i:- ari'"
f*-0 0'^' :' f; i_ v'' 1 fq.t ‘ .' V 77 X. 01. . .-
1
a:..':'x:o 3 .i'V'.T-,,,.70 j ^Ol'l .fa'iTs ? .?
37 . .r:7>nj i.7-: !• X£ci:?x : ’.'.oe-l nJT . -ir. -j C ^.' j. X ...::o - 0 .* - . . X . Ai. -J . • "iCi
r*
V r ?'7 T:J:a;i vo’ jv1i p '-Y /' rr
’s^
I07 1 '7 4. .- , , : , "
,
J i'V! ^•K J n.^ a . ^ . ; .-r
J
^
X 1 ... vi
•J Xi CH X a. a - IVYn 7 D >'r:7;t?A ' j -K ifHn'u •37 or. r; !: • f; r*r 3Ii.7 0*'^
1'- ’ Hv. ta 3 Irfl'a r* . iiOuv;
:
»
-.xr, I y' V L lOi.I-' I; oiv r ...
-.’nil' i:''T ’. 7Oi«0pnli7 ''
0
• c’i nc vo'n; aenjti ac:^. : n
ij
39 .
CHAPTER III
i
j
I I
j
THE METAPHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NONRATIONAL FACTOR
|
t
j
I i
I The previous chapter revealed the basis of Pratt *s asser-f
tion of a nonrational factor. It showed how such a factor is
;
j
I
an integral part of Pratt’s treatment of basic epistemological i!
i
issues. A reference theory of meaning in a dualistic setting, ,
a theory of external-internal relations, and a conception of
|
I
truth which harmonizes with the theory of meaning all imply, in
j,
various ways, that in the existent world there is a nonrational
jj
element. il
The present chapter supplements the previous one in that
j
it shows how other aspects of Pratt’s philosophy entail a non-
|
I
rational element. It will extend the basis for asserting such
a factor. But its primary purpose is to make clear the meta-
j
physical significance of the nonrational element in Pratt’s per-f!
•I
sonal realism. The theme of this chapter, then, is the part as-rj
li
signed to tae nonrational factor in answering such primal ques- I'
i'
tions as: What is existence or being? What are universals? Is 'i
!'
the self real? This chapter will show how everything Pratt re- |j
ij
gards as ultimate and real has an aspect which is outside
reason, which is nonrational.
j
A. Critical Realism and Metaphysics.
The analysis of the metaphysical significance of the
nonrational factor suggests at once some questions concerning
the relation of critical realism to metaphysics in general. In

i 40.
his contribution to Essays in Critical Realism Pratt pointed
I
out that critical realism, of which personal realism is a varia-j
tion, does not pretend to he a metaphysical theory of the ulti-
|j
mate nature of the world of objects. The critical realist, so
it was asserted, may be a panpsychist, Platonist, or idealist,
|j
He makes metaphysical judgments only as they are needed for his
|
|l
epistemological theory.
^
jj
Pratt *s belief that epistemological theory needs some
jj
i
metaphysical judgments calls to attention the general problem
j|
!!
of the relation of epistemology and metaphysics. In spite of 'i
i
those neorealists who insist the theory of knowledge has no
|
!
priority to metaphysics the influence of Kant persists in the
|
I
wide recognition that man*s judgments about the actual char- |
I
acter of the world depend to a great extent on the way he must !
I
think about the world. However, it is not necessary here to
|
solve the deep and difficult problem of the exact relation of !
i
metaphysics and epistemology. It is only necessary to take |i
I
Pratt *s word that critical realism primarily is epistemological!
jj
doctrine, but it does have bearings on ontology,^ j!
!
The metaphysical reference of the nonrational factor in
(i
Pratt’s personal realism is more than inference from a "pure"
|
I
1 Cf, Pratt, ECR, 109. The discovery of the inner nature of
|
things the critical realist, says Pratt, leaves to metaphysics *
and science. But in terms of his more recent views science and!
metaphysics can find out nothing about the "inner nature of |
things" unless they forsake the realm of essence and get to thej
intrinsic nature of things through immediate experience!
|
2 Of. Pratt, CAP, II, 216.

epistemology. Personal Realism ^ written seventeen years after
Pratt’s contribution to Essays in Critical Realism, is a more
ij
mature and complete expression of his philosophy, and in it ji
Pratt makes many metaphysical pronouncements in carrying his !
i
epistemological views to their wider conclusions. For example,
j;
i
Pers onal Realism devotes whole chanters to the status of uni- !j
^
i!
versals, substance, existence, and causation. Again, the proofsji
j:
of Pratt’s own dualistic epistemology sum up much of what he
i|
!|
has said previously about existence and substance in characteri-|i
’j
zing the "ontological object."^ The statement of the purpose
' of Personal Realism makes it quite impossible to side-step
I
I metaphysical Issues: "The chief purpose of this book, as I have
I
indicated, is to investigate what philosophy can make of the
general nature of the existential world."^ So in spite of the
attention personal realism pays to epistemology it is quite
legitimate to look for the ontological significance of the non-
rational factor.
B. The Realm of Existence.
The nonrat ional fact or first takes on metaphysical im-
portance in the "realm of existence." Pratt uses the phrase,
realm of existence, in contrast to the realm of essence which is
composed of universals, concepts, logical entitles, definable
3 Cfo Pratt, PR, 101-2.
4 Ibid., 191.
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natures, and qualities* Neither realm can be wholly understood
or defined apart from the other* This reciprocal relation of
the two realms not only results in some ambiguities, but it
presents certain practical difficulties in trying to discuss
one realm apart from the other* Nevertheless, if any start is
to be made here, it must be made by taking up one thing at a
time*
In discussing the nature of existence as contrasted with
i
essence Pratt opens up a subject almost as old as philosophy* i
In fact the subject was first touched on by Plato* The issue
}
was kept alive in Scholastic philosophy, and in the twentieth- '
century philosophy of George Santa:^7ana it was given new vitali- 1'
s
ty and significance as it was fitted into the matrix of a acepti-*
I
(
cal, realistic philosophy* !
Ii
Since Pratt defines the realm of existence partly by con-^|
•j
trusting it with the "realm of essence," a phrase borrowed from
|
Santayana, it is highly apropos to know what Santayana meant by !
this phrase* For Santayana qualities, ideal terms, and char-
5
acters constitute the realm of essence* Moreover, such signs
I
as sounds, sights, smells, and sensations are essences which
envisage the same object* Since the realm of essence and its
1
relation to the nonrational factor will be fully discussed lateili
!|
in this chapter, no more need by said about it here* It is suf-|
ficient to note that Pratt’s conception of existence, as much
^ Of* Santayana, RE, vii-viii.
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as existence can be conceived, in a general way follows
Santayana’s statement that
V/hat the object is in its complete constitution and
history will never be known by man; but that this
object exists in a knovm space and time and has
physical relations with all other physical objects
is a fact posited from the beginning.
^
In the iimriediately following paragraphs it v/ill be shown Pratt
partially agrees with Santayana by asserting that "an existent
individual is never completely definable, but he refuses to
draw the same sceptical conclusions as Santayana.
1. Things.
An existent is a substance, and it is equivalent to Y/hat
is popularly known as a thing. ^ Thus the realm of existence is
nothing more than the realm of individual things. This sheet
of paper, this typewriter, and this desk are substances or com-
plexes of substances. As to the character of individual things
Pratt says that "an existent individual is never completely de-
finable. After all its qualities have been abstracted and
named, there remains ever a residue Y/hich is not identical with
any quality or namable essence. "9 a thing or existent, hovrever.
f
S Santayana, SAP, 177,
f|I
ii-
|,
Pratt,
I 8 cf. ibid.,
I
^ Ibid., 53.
PR, 53,
64, 66.
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is not identical with this residue for it exists entire with
its qualities. It includes its qualities, and they cannot ex-
j
ist without this residue I
How does Pratt come to such a conclusion? He arrives at Ij
ij
this point hy distinguishing first of all between the realm of
II
essence and existence and declaring that the former is not iden-;
il
tical with the latter because essences -- definable natures,
|
concepts, and qualities -- are not the whole of the real. They ,
I
I
do not exliausb the real, iixistence is always something more be-
;
yond essence. In proof of this contention Pratt leans on
|
Bradley and Aristotle. Bradley argues that philosophical
j
thought and judgment Inevitably lead to a disjoining of quality
j
from being:
If we take up anything considered real, no matter
what it is, we find in it two aspects. There are i
always two things we can say about it; and if we
j
cannot say both, we have not got reality. There I
is a "what" and a "that," an existence and a con- !
tent, and the two are inseparable. .. ,If we try to
|j
get the "that" by Itself, we do not get it. For
jl
either we have it qualified, or else we fail utter- i;
ly. If we try to get the "what" by itself, we find
ij
at once it is not all. Itpolnts to something be-
}!
yond, and cannot exist by itself and as a bare ad- i!
jective. . . .And yet thought seems essentially to i
consist in their division. For thought is clearly,
|
to some extent at least, ideal. Without an idea
j
there is no thinking, and an idea implies the separa-
tion of content from existence. It is a "what" ‘
which, so far as it is a mere idea, clearly 5^ not, i
and if it also were could, so far, not be called
ideal. For ideality lies in the disjoining of
{
quality from being.ll i
10 Cf. Pratt, PR, 56, 65. |
11 Bradley, AR, 162-63.
j
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1
Of course Pratt does not pursue this analysis to Bradley’s con- :
li
elusion that thought must have its character transformed by be- '
il
ing absorbed into a whole which includes thought, feeling, and
;!
will* jje uses Bradley’s remarks to show that existence cannotil
be defined but only exhibited. And reals or existents exhibit ;i
I
themselves as " that virhich is capable of making a difference to ij
'i
experience," This is the final criterion of reality or actuali- li
ty. 13
Similarly in discussing substance, which is equivalent
j
!
to existence, Pratt concludes with Aristotle that it has 'both !
form and a non-rational surd -- both a what and a that,"^^ The I
|i
Aristotelian definition makes substance that of v/hich other I!
I
things are predicated, while substance Itself is not predicated
of anything else. It can exist apart, but its attributes can-
t
not, Pratt warns against construing substance as that which ex-|
ists without qualities. He insists such a view is not true to ^
Aristotle who believed "a substance is a thing entire with its ii
I
qualities," Although substance must possess qualities, it is
j
i
12, Bradley, AR, 170-72.
jj
12 The assertion that "any combination of what and that which
jj
actually can affect experience" is real recalls the Leibnizian i
principle that esse est agere . For Leibniz nonbeing = that ij
which has no activity, force, 6r actuality. But Pratt’s criteri-*'
on of actuality needs further interpretation. Even though es- [i
sences are logical abstractions from a whole experience, they i
make a difference to experience. No existent is without expres-|
sed qualities or conceptual form. But substances or existents
|(combinations of wha.tness and thatness ) independent of one’s own
particular experience more satisfactorily explain that experi-
j
ence. The actual, then, is the object of a coherent hypothesis,
j
1^ Pratt, PR, 52,
i

i more than these for it is a unity which includes qualities and
i
!
I; a surd or unknovm element, matter. Substance is not equivalent
|
i'
!
to indescribable and indefinable matter, the "that which must bej
added to the what if we are to have an actual entity. I
I
i By leaning on Bradley and Aristotle Pratt attempts to
I
i delineate in some communicable manner the character of existence
j
and the realm of existence. The upshot of his whole argument
jj
i|
is that "the givenness of the existent is not a definable quali-
ii
!j
ty, and hence there is in existence a non-rational but purely
i empirical element."^® This conclusion follows from the dis-
I
1 tinction between the realm of essence and the realm of exist-
' ence which was made earlier. That substances, existents, things
I
have an "indefinable, non-rational element or aspect"l*7 is a
!' corollary of Pratt’s more basic contention that concepts, de-
'j
finable natures, and qualities are not the whole of the real,
!i
Ij
that existence is more than essence and not exhausted by essence;,
i; Pratt sees in such a conception of things or existents
j|
! the possibility of a coherent explanation of motion and change.
i
T Q
jl
All qualities or essences are eternal, and substances are
ij
self-identical continuants. But change is possible because
i'
i|
|l
15 Pratt, PR, 66.
ii 15 Ibid., 55, 58.
i 17 Ibid., 66.
I
15 Cf, ibid,, 71, This agrees closely with Santayana’s view:
jj
"Essence is just that character which any existence wears in so
Ii far as it remains identical with itself." Existence changes, en-
i'
dures, but essences are exchanged not changed. Existence trans-
|!
fers essences. Cf. Santayana, RE, 23.

things may transfer qualities. This conception also has the
advantage of heing compatible with epistemological dualism
which seems to answer the basic needs of a theory of knowledge
and provide a plausible explanation of error. The basic thesis
of Pratt’s epistemological theory is that there are three fac-
tors in the knowledge situation: the conscious subject, the
mental content, and the object. But the object may be an
epistemological or ontological object. If it is the former, it
is a definable nature or essence. If it is the latter, it is
a thing, existent, or substance in the sense in which these
terms have already been defined. Although the epistemological
object may characterize the ontological object, the two can
never be treated as identical without confusing essence and ex-
istence,^^ Prom biological necessity and for pragmatic reasons
m^n acquires probable knowledge about existents. He grasps
some of their more obvious and practically significant rela-
tional qualities. But man can never grasp the intrinsic char-
acter of things. As existents, ontological objects always have
an element which is beyond their essence, beyond the epistemo-
logical object.
The nonrational or purely empirical factor in existents
restricts knowledge of things, as mediate and indirect, to
probabilities, "No realist," says Pratt, "claims that we are
acquainted with material reality from within. It is not inner
r 19 Of. Pratt, PR, 204-5.
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! nature “but relations and structure that are the objects of know-
I
ledge in the physical world, It is quite obvious how such
!
i epistemological distinctions as critical realists make can pro-
i
p-i i
I
duce Santayana’s scepticism and animal falth,'^-^ Pratt, to be
|
II !
!;
sure, does not draw such extreme conclusions as Santayana, but
i
[;
his assertion of a nonrational element places the intrinsic
character of things outside the sphere of knowledge proper.
The description of the realm of existence, of the char-
acter of things and substances has shown that in any thing whic
I
I
really exists there is a nonrational element, Pratt realizes
I
the acceptance of this conclusion lays one open to "the charge
jl
I' of supporting a non-rational philosophy, But he is willing
l|
ii to take this position to avoid a form of rationalism or ideal-
j
ism which confines itself to the realm, of essence, concepts,
1
definable natures, logical and mathematical entities. In ans-
! wer to those idealists who wonder what reality could be more
!'
f
than the world of meanings and definable natures Pratt says:
"It could be a world of existent things -- things which possess
or are qualified by logical predicates, but which have an ex-
istential aspect that goes beyond definable natures. The
20 Pratt, Art, 13, 709,
21 Besides dreams, hallucinations, objects of fancy, and num-
bers Santayana places sense data amiong essences. Hence no data
exist, Exlstents must be known by animal faith. For Pratt men-
tal content exists. At the samxe time it may have another func-
tion. It may be a meaning -- essence, logical entity -- as well
as a fact. Of, Pratt, PR, 152, 200; ECR, 230-34. Montague,
Art. 1, 157, Brightm.an, P6IC, 264,
22 Pratt, PR, 72.
23 Pratt, APR, 126-27,
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world of the idealist or rationalist is only a world of essences
in which there is room for nothing else; it would he better
for him to talk about the Abstract Universal rather than the
pA
Concrete Universal, By admitting that exist ents have a- non-
rational element and by distinguishing between essence and ex-
istence Pratt takes up the sword against rationalism:
Not a few philosophers, however, who maintain the
identity of the real with the rational are unwilling
to recognize the contrast between the realm of es-
sence and that of existence; they insist upon deal-
ing with matters belonging to the existential world,
yet deny that there is in existence a non-rational
but purely empirical element
The criticism of this conception of things and the mem-
bers of the realm of existence must be postponed until a later
chapter. At this point, however, it is clear that the non-
rational factor is of great metaphysical significance for it
provides the distinction between essence and existence, it
shows how change and motion are possible, and it precludes the
supposed rationalistic identification of the rational -- defin-
able natures, essences, meanings — with the real by forcing
"the recognition of an empirical, non-rational, given element
within reality,"^®
Pratt, APR, 129.
25 Pratt, PR, 59.
26 Ibid., 61.
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I
2. Selves,
So far the discussion of the realm of existence has
i identified an existent with what is commonly thought of as a
.
}
I
physical thing. It has excluded what Pratt thinks is the most
i
i
imoortant existent, the self. In the preface to Personal
jj
ij Realism he distinguishes his philosophy from that of his crlti-
!i
jj
cal realist colleagues:
I I have long felt that the naturalistic conclusions
Ij sometimes drawn from Critical Realism were not justi-
;[
fied; and that our doctrine of knowledge pointed,
||
rather, in a direction quite different from that of
|i Naturalism and was hound, in fact, to lead ultimate-
j|
ly to a conception of the partial independence and
ij spontaneity of mind and of the reality of a suh-
i! stantlal self,2V
li
(i
jj
So the most mature expression of Pratt’s philosophy may with
|l
;|
justice he labelled personal realism for it aims to defend hoth
'! realism and the actuality of the individual. These remarks
I
!; comhined with the previous discussion of the realm of existence
ii
j
make a positive suggestion about Pratt’s view of the self. In
!; the latter part of Personal Realism Pratt says that the aim of
I
his whole treatment of the self is to show "that experience,
'I
|j
consciousness, of the human sort, no matter what the object of
||
its awareness, is the sort of thing that naturally points to and
Ij inevitably presupposes an existent subject. "28 Xn addition.
j
i
' Pratt, PR, vili.
' 28 itid., 275.

then, to physical things the self is a member of the realm of
1|
existence. The self is an existent,
ji How does Pratt come to this conclusion? First of all,
it should he noted that Pratt’s emphasis on the reality and
significance of the self is not an innovation with Personal
Realism , Only two yearsafter the publication of the collective
,
j|
Fssays in Critical Realism in the Nathaniel W, Taylor Lectures
!' ( Matter and Spirit ) Pratt was v/arring against his naturalistic
|i
j
colleagues. He was arguing that consciousness can be denied or
reduced to matter only by ignoring obvious and significant com-
mon experiences, 29 However, his conception of the self in 1922
was not his view in 1937, The specific characterof that change
will be discussed later. At this point the problem is to dis-
' cover how his more mature thinking as expressed in Personal
i;
I
:! Realism leads to the conception of the self as an existent,
ji
ij Pratt reviews the outstanding psychological theories
|j
showing how each of them denies or presents evidence for the
ii
ji reality of the self. In the hands of Locke, Hume, Mill, and
I
Bain associationlst psychology and its heir, structural psycho-
I
h
II
logy, collapses into atomism, It caricatures human experience
jl
;
by offering a picture of man’s consciousness which is unrecog-
j:
nizable,^^ Such a view ignores the nature of awareness, the act
i|
(
ii of transcendence, and the fact that sensations come drenched
29 cf, Pratt, MS, 172-78,
30 Cf, Pratt, PR, 277; RR, 48,
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.
'I
li
'1
!j
with meaning, all of which point to the existence of a thinker
i;
ij
{l or subject. James tried to refute associationism by the intro-
i!
|i duction of momentary selves. Such a view is, to be sure, sup-
I
I
ported by considerable empirical evidence. But it is impossible
|j
i; to see how there can be any continuity in mental life if each
!!
j
momentary self is different and separate from the preceding one.
Such a theory as this one cannot provide for the carrying over
of what is momentarily forgotten. James him^self recognized the
I
difficulties involved in his theory of momentary selves. He
wondered how the fields of experience which have a common cog-
!
j
nitive function can have no being in common. Then he knew that
1
;i
'i he must choose between psychology without a soul and one with a
I'
l| soul. Pratt declares James abandoned logic and declared the
i| problem 'unsolvable.^^
I
Behaviorism, Pratt argues, throws no light on the nature
‘ of the self. If it does not deny cons^clousness
,
it Ignores the
I
activity of the subject in intelligent as contrasted to reflex-
i!
:i
ive behavior. In criticism of Gestalt psychology Pratt says
!
I
it stops its course in mid-air, failing to recognize that “with-*
out a perceiver the unity and activity involved in any percept
or concept or in any realization or utilization of a Gestalt
ij is quite inexplicable.
'!
||31 Of. Pratt, PR, 285.
|i 32
ii
Of, ibid.. 287; Pratt, RR, 53-54.
1!
33 Pratt, PR, 287.
I!
'i

34
In preference to the conclusions drawn from association-
ism, behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology Pratt takes a view of
the self as an existent subject, evidence for such a viev;' may
be found in Aristotle’s psychology which refuted associationism
before it was formulated. Aristotle pointed out that man’s abi-|
lity to perceive that he sees and hears and his pov;er to make
comparisons imply a sensus communis which in principle is the
same as a unified self.
In addition there is an epistemological argument in favoii
of the reality of the self. Pratt agrees with Kant that the
4
unity and continuity of thought presupposes a unified subject
which comprehends the order of the manifold of intuition. Al-
though Kant’s philosophy implies no existent or substantial
self, Pratt thinks sound epistemology gives genuine evidence
that the self is actual and existent. Moreover, without the
fact of transcendence and the capacity of judging, knowledge
and meaning are unthinkable. But transcendence and meaning are
possible only because the self is an existent other than the
stream of consciousness. This inference, however, may be ques-
tioned. '^Vheelwright has pointed out that the material conditloi|
of subjective self-transcendence is the temporal nature of the
self. The self that is known is "old" or past, but the subject
is ideally in the present and actually in the specious present.
53
.
ij Cf. Pratt, PR, 283, 285-86.
ji
l| Cf. ibid., 289.
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I
36 Cf. Brightman, P6IC, 124, Brightman, Art* 3, 135*
! 37 Pratt, PR, 301. Cf. Pratt, RR, 50.
—
f
j! There really is no need to go to a substantial self to bolster
i|
jl transcendence. It is only necessary to recognize that the pre-
jj
sent complex of consciousness, datum self, or "given" refers to
i
something other than Itself which is epistemologically an hypo-
thetical entity. To interpret this situation more radically,
knowledge as a conscious process is always part of an empirical
situation or given complex of consciousness that refers to
other empirical situations with which it is linked by memory
jj
and anticipation. Thus \Vheelwright ’ s assertion that self-trans-
I cendence depends on the temporal nature of the self becomes
i
II clear. An immanental view of the self, such as will be describee
jj
jj
shortly, not only explains transcendence but is more empirical
it
j
and less mysterious than Pratt’s view, 36
Psychological and epistemological considerations, Pratt
i! claims, point to a self which is actual and existent. The self
i!
!| is a substance in the way that term has already been defined,
!1
"and that means an existent being possessing qualities . "37 Like
other substances it has a "what" and a "that," and its "what"
jl may be learned by observing what the self does. Observation
|l
ji will reveal the qualities of the self, and as in the case of
physical things the self as substance is never divorced from its
qualities. Moreover, the self is sul generis
,
so categories
1 which are applied to physical things cannot be applied to it:
j;
ll

II
i-
!i
"..•a self is a substance of its own kind. It is sui -eneris .
It has a unity not possessed by physical things, a unity which
exists simultaneously with variety. This peculiar quality of
the self is evidenced in the way it maintains itself through
its experiences: It is the subject of cognition and feeling; it
is the actor and doer of deeds; it endures in the midst of
change and variety.
Pratt recognizes his view of the self is similar to the
pure ego of traditional philosophy and the conception of the
soul as transcendent to consciousness. But it is different
I from the theories of a transcendent soul or pure ego in that
II
I
every substantial self has its own peculiar inseparable quali-
ties and characteristics. Furthermore, Pratt warns against
I
misconstruing his substantial self:
By substance one does not mean an abstract core of
being taken in itself, but an entity with characters,
j
There is no substance without attributes and no
j
characterless self without qualities or acts. As
jl well ask for an existent form completely divorced
(I
from matter.39
II
i Pratt anticipates those who would ask what the self is miore
i'
|,
than a stream of consciousness. His anticipatory remarks m^ay
|! be taken as a thrust against the conception of the self as im-
I
m^anent in consciousness:
' What is the self aside from all its acts? The an-
i swer is that the self is never without attributes.
i
»
I
I
I Pratt,
39 Ibid.,
PR, 301.
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ji and if it v/ere, it would be nothing at all. It
ij
that which has certain characters and acts in
I
certain ways.'^O
i'
!' Since the self is a substance or an existent, most of the
I
qualifications which apply to the whole realm of existence ap-
ply to it. The self has a "what" and a "that." The apprehen-
sion of its whatness, its characters, qualities, definable
ji nature, or essence does not exhaust its existence. Like physi-
II
j. cal things the self may change because it is an existent and
j; not a pure unchangeable and eternal essence. Knowledge of the
[I
!' self is like the knowledge of physical things. is indirect,
ir
|j
"knowledge about." Hume showed quite conclusively that intro-
spection gives no direct knowledge of the self. The self can-
not, moreover, be conceived as other objects C'-.n because it is
essentially subject. But it is only unknowable in the same way
(
j|
as other objects are unknowable: only indirect knowledge of it
II
is possible. On this point Pratt says:
. Our knowledge of the physical world is indirect;
it is knowledge about
,
not acquaintance with . We
have at least the same kind of knowledge of the self.
We do not find it as we do its feelings and per-
cepts; but everyone has a natural impulsion to be-
lieve in it, and our experience is such that no
theory is satisfactory which fails to recognize the
self as actor and knower, the inner unity and the
inner unifier of our ^multifarious lives. We know
that the self is, and we know what it is by observa-
ij tion of what it does.41
i'
||
i
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40 Pratt, PR, 304.
ij
41 Ibid., 311.
I.
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As a member of the realm of existence the self has a non-
rat ional factor just as does every other existent or substance.
the self," says Pratt, "is emphatically an existent being.
Hence it will have its non-rational aspect just as does every
existent thing.
Since the self is a member of the realm of existence, it
is something more than all its qualities and characters reveal
it to be. This implies a theory of a transcendent self.'^^ Pratt
recognizes that his view of the self is, with minor qualifica-
tions, identical with the pure ego of traditional philosophy.
Personal Realism and some of Pratt *s other writings show he has
been strongly influenced by James. To avoid the impasse of
James’s theory of momentary selves and to make his own views
harmonize with the evidence of introspection Pratt has readily
accepted a form, of personalism. In its recent expression this
personalism advances a theory of a transcendent self. The rudi-
ments of such a theory appeared in some of Pratt’s earlier
writings. In Matter and Spirit (1922) he defined the self as
"a center of psychic power's whose characteristics necessarily
transcend any given section of conscious content or phase of
conscious experience, and which are not exhaustible by any pas-
sing moment. He cautioned against thinking of the self as
Pratt, PR, 303, 315.
Of. Vivas, Art. 1, 301.
Pratt, MS, 179.
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the unqualified "blank substance of the scholastics and as the
pure perceiving substance of some of the idealists. The self
is not a mere "that xvhichy for its own peculiar characteristics
which are to be learned empirically cannot be separated from it
Pratt’s definition of the self is in direct contrast
with a theory of an immanent self such as that held by Laird
and Brightman.'^^ The theory of an immanent self asserts that
personality can be nothing more than what consciousness reveals
it to be. The self can not be understood as something apart
from or more than consciousness. It is consciousness experienc-
ing itself as belonging in a whole. It is "the whole range of
present, past, and future experiences which belong with the
datum self [^’a present complex consciousness by virtue of con-
scious linkages."^®
In some of Pratt’s writings he defines the self in terms
very much like the theory of an immanent self. The article en-
titled "Natural Religion; Consciousness and Its Implications"
in the Harvard Theological Review (1923) stated:
The doctrine of the reality of the self...means
rather the active unity of experience itself as
Samuel Johnson, first president of Columbia University and
one of America’s first philosophers, committed himself to the
theory of an immanent self. In a letter to Berkeley, February
5, 1729/30, he wrote: "Viniat I intended by those Questions v/as
whither our Ideas are not the Substance of the Soul itself,
under so many various modifications, according to that saying
(if I understand it right) Intellectus Intelligendo fit omnia ?"
Riley, AP, 90. Cf. also Brightman, Art. 3, 130-2, on Berkeley.
58 .
46 Brightman, ML, 79. Cf. also Brightman, Art. 3, 133-35.

it goes forward in time, cleaving time as a spear-
head steadily cleaves the air, and identical with its
own past in much the same whay that anything is identi-
cal with its own past. Taken in this sense the self
is both active, unitary, continuous, and real; and it
is to this real and discoverable kind of self that,
as it seems to me, James’s conception ultimately is
reducible* ^*7
Again, in his contribution to the collective volume entitled
Religious Realism Pratt seems to disagree with what he has said
elsewhere about the self:
The doctrine of the reality of the self does not
necessarily maintain the existence of an unknow-
able something outside experience and transcend-
ing time. It means rather the active unity of ex-
perience itself as it goes forward in time... *48
But the more recent expression of Pratt’s views in Personal
Realism , it has been shown, defines the self as a ’’substantive
existent.” The self is transcendent in that it is something
more than its qualities and acts. Like any other existent the
self never exists apart from its essence -- its definable naturei,
qualities, and characteristics. At the same time these do not
exhaust the existence of the self which is a permanent, abiding
|
substance
.
The m-ost important members of the realm of existence are
things and selves. Inasmuch as they are substances or existents
whose definable nature does not exhaust their being, they pos-
sess a nonratlonal or purely empirical element.
!l
:!
!i
i
47 Pratt, Art. 10, 300-1.
t
48 Pratt, RR, 49.
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IT
C. The Realm of ijJssence.
It
It
I'
To "put one’s finger on" essences or the realm of essence
I*
' in general is a difficult task for several reasons; If ihe char-
‘ acterization is to he a definition rather than a mere exhihitiorl
i
!
of the term in question, it must relate essences to exi stents,
i
jj
As it has been suggested earlier in this chapter, however, the
}|
realm of existence cannot he understood apart from essences.
Hoernle has sensed this difficulty aj.id suggests that the defini-
tion of hoth terms must he tautological. Furthermore, the cri-
tical realists from. whom Pratt has horrov/ed his doctrine of
essence are neither clear nor in agreement about it. Hence
Pratt’s exposition is not without its ambiguities and obscuri-
j
ties. Nevertheless some characterization must be made of es-
I
sences. They occupy one v;ing of a dichotomy that is essential
I
to Pratt’s theory of knowledge and to his discovery of the real
I
I
Perhaps the doctrine of essence can be set forth in a
I
clearer light by answering the question: liVhat specifically are
I
some essences ? What entities are m.embers of the realm of essence?'
I
j
According to Pratt possible objects of thought such as logical
i
j
entities, universals, propositions, concepts, laws, and epistemJ
ological objects or data of knowledge are all members of the
60
.
realm of essence 49 There is one characteristic which all these
|i entities have in common. They have a logical rather than
li Cf. Pratt, PR, 42-44
_JL
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psychological or physical status. that those entities have
a logical status and a logical objectivity (all are referred to
as epistemological objects) they are changeless, timeless, and
eterna]^, ”In the realm of essence," says Pratt, "nothing can
happen. All these logical entities are necessarily bound
up with each other through internal relations of implication in
one self- identical, unchanging implicative system.
By devious paths the doctrine of essences may be traced
back to Plato. It probably came into critical realism through
r:o
the influence of Santayana. Plato distinguished between the
timeless and eternal realm of Ideas and the existent order of
becoming, change and duration:
That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason
is always in the same state; but that which is con-
ceived by opinion with the help of sensation and
without reason is always in a process of becoming
and perishing and never really Is.^^
Pratt refers to this passage in the Timaeus to show that Plato
distinguished between the realm of logical entities or essences
and the realm, of existence. But Plato obviously meant some-
thing the opposite of Pratt’s view. He meant that the eternal
and timeless realm of pure forms or Ideas is the realm of real
being or genuine existence. The order of becoming, which for
i! Cf. Pratt, PR, 198. Strong, ECR, 228-30.
I'
i: Pratt, PR, 121. Cf. Montague, WK, 353-54,
52 Tovmsend, PIUS, 250-51.
ii
jl 53 jowett, DP, II, 523.

Pratt is true being, is illusory appearance. Santayana also
compares essences to the Platonic Ideas:
Although essence have the texture and ontological [sic i|
status of platonic ideas, they can lay claim to none
of the cosmological metaphysical or moral prerogatives
attributed to those ideas. 53
There is one way in which Pratt’s doctrine of essences
differs from that of Santayana.' If this difference is grasped,
a more adequate characterization of essences is at hand.
Santayana places what are commonly referred to as sense-data in
the realm of essences. "Miscellaneous essences such as sights,
sounds, smells, and contacts are signs the animal has for the
object. Thus knowledge is the nature of belief in a world of
objects and events that precedes the intuition of essences. "54
For Strong also sensations are essences. If they were not
"meanings" they would have to be facts or real things,. If the
perceived color red, for example, is real, the oscillations by
which the scientist explains it are not. To avoid this dilem-
ma, Strong regards sensa as essences, But Pratt restricts es-
sences to a purely conceptual order and consequently lands in
a dilemma as to how to handle t-he assertion of his critical
realist colleagues that the datum
,
the essence is given. The
mark of an existent, it was pointed out earlier, is its given-
ness as brute fact, its nonrat ional element which distinguishes
Santayana, SAP, 78.
54 Ibid., 175.
55 Cf. Pratt, ECR, 224-28.

jj
it from an essence. That Pratt restricts essences to the con-
i' ceptual realm is clear from his theory of knowledge in which he
!! cal object. If the mental content -- images, sensa, feelings.
!
and experiences of every sort which are existents ^^-- is ap-
prehended in knowledge, it is characterized by essences jast as
I
is any other existent:
j
Our mental content we immediately apprehend; but when
we begin making statements about it, we begin separat-
ing the what from the that , and find ourselves think-
ing about the definable nature of an existent psychic
content .57
Just as the effort to define the category of existence
involved essence, the characterization of essences, it is now
i
Ij obvious, entails reference to existents. For an essence, which
jj
j
is a logica] entity, epistemological object, or definable
i
j
nature, is not an existent. It may characterize or represent
I
I
a thing which exists but not be identified with it. It is con-
!|
ceptual or ideal and as such distinct from being. So a character-
»
ization of the realm of essence gives a negative definition of
' the distinguishing mark of an existent, its nonrational factor.
I
I
Although essence and existence have been treated in
I
>
I
this chapter as metaphysical elements, it is clear that they
I are distinctly related to Pratt's theory of knowledge. In fact
I
j
they perpetuate the distinction between epistemological and
I
i
i
I
I
!l
Cf. Pratt, PR,
57 Ibid., 200.
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64 ,
ontological objects. At this stage of the discussion those
formal elements in the knowledge situation are examined for
themselves to discover to what extent they are finally real.
The result is a bifurcation of the universe into a rational or
conceptual sphere which is only real in a pragmatic sense and
an order of existents marked by a nonrational or ourely empiri-
cal aspect. In spite of his frequent caution that existents ancf^
essences are never identical Pratt’s good judgment unifies them
in concrete substances and in epistemological theory. He knows
that a realm of essence, as an order of possibilities, concepts,
symbols, and meanings, has no reality (but "pragmatic”) apart
from things. The nonrational factor, which is the mark of
existence, is also an abstraction. Together, in an organic
whole, they are the real. Separately they are the results of
abstract atomistic analysis -- just as misleading and guilty of
reifying abstractions as the "extreme rationalism" Pratt so
vehemently attacks*
D. Contingency.
|j
In addition to its metaphysical significance for things,
I
substances, selves, and essences the nonrational factor answers
|j
the need for contingency in Pratt’s philosophy. In the first
ji
!| chapter it was pointed out that Pratt for a long time tried to
|i
j|
be an idealist, but the influence of William James’s tychistic
and pluralistic world view was too strong for him. He turned
against idealism with its logical necessities and "extreme
i|
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!j
rationalism" toward a view which would make a place for hrute
I fact and the givenness of existents, his present position, per-
!j
sonal realism, is a "non-rational philosophy" which provides
!
I'
for contingency, fact, individuality, and chance.
If
"Contingent," derived from the Latin contindentia
,
came
into wide use with the schoolmen who applied this term to
I
what is actual and accidental in c ntrast to what is logically
t necessary.^® However, "contingent" amy be traced back to Greek
I
philosophy which distinguished between the world in accordance
il
'
j! with laws and what is m-arked by accident and not determined by
i!
!|
laws. Under the leadership of the schoolment the medieval
church attached itself to the philosophy of Aristotle and the
Neoplatonists . Medieval theologians recognized with Aristotle
the imperfections of the lower spheres of existence and with
Plotinus pointed to the disorganization of pure idea by sense
and matter. Their efforts to reconcile the realm of nure ideas
P|i
jj
with the realm of actual or contingent things led to compromise^
jj
jj
which ranged from modified Aristotelianism, through mysticism,
II
ji to nominalism, with the revival of pantheism in modern philos-
I
ophy -- especially in Spinoza — there came a wave of rational-
II
j
ism which outlawed contingency. In opposition empiricism, ex-
j|
pounded by Locke, Hume, and Kant, emphasized contingency and
il
I
58 Of. Hastings, ERE, II, 87-89.
s: Cf. Pratt, PR, 54-55.
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rrra-
also relocated, the issue at stake. "Contingent^’ now came to
mean "the irrational factor beside and within the rational.
The problem of contingency is one of the most searching
metaphysical issues. Within its devious ramifications lurk the
salient problems of philosophy. It is the question of the rela'
tion of what is rational to what is irrational, of what, is actu'
al to what is logical, of spontaneity and chance to necessity.
The immediate task here is to discover the place of contingency
in Pratt’s philosophy and not to attempt any reconciliation be-
tween the rational and the contingent which Troeltsch thinks is
impossible an3H;vay "for the actual thining activity of man con-
sists in a continuous combination of the antitheses. "61 Pratt
m^kes the claims of contingency secure through "the non- ration-
al but purely empirical element."
Contingency emerges with the specification of existence;
by a quotation from Santayana Pratt strikes the keynote of his
view; "Existence is odious to the logician. "62 very fact
that "an existent individual is never comipletely definable" and
contains a given or purely empirical elem.ent m.eans that the
world is not tightly logical and rationally ordered throughout.
Only in the universe of the rigorous rationalist, according to
Pratt, is the real the rational or the logical. Such a phllos-
60 Hastings, ERE, II, 88.
r
[
61 Ibid., 89.
[
62 Pratt, PR, 51. Of. Santayana, SAP, 59-60.
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I, ophy, he charges, deals only with the realm of essences, defin-
|1
ij able natures, or logical entities. The empirical philosopher,
!i
: on the other hand, is willing to admit "non-conceptual experi-
!j
ence into the real,”®^
ii
I Pratt’s conscience for contingency is most apparent in
ij
i
his discussion of causation. He argues that "since causation
belongs not to the realm of essence but to that of existence,
it cannot be interpreted aspurely logical in its nature,"®^
Causation, if it is to have any significance, must be a relationj
between existent s which have a nonrational element. It must be
i
more than a logical relationship. According to Pratt the ex-
i
’ treme rationalists imply that causality is a logical relation
il
i|
:j
describable by deduction and involving logical necessity. If
|i they took cognizance of the nonrational element in being, they
'I
Ii would have to agree that genuine causal relations are discover-
i|
i able only by induction and experience and are more than lllustra
I
tions of the a priori Law of Identity. A view of causality as
I*
! a relation between existents takes cognizance of its temporal
I
aspect. Then causality is defined as "continuity of process,
carried on within substances or between substances , "65 Thus, it
is a relation between objects which are not wholly rational. It
is a contingent relation based on experience as well as logic.
j
Pratt, PR, 61, Cf. Chapter IV, "The Real and the Rational."
164 Ibid., 126-27. Cf. Pratt, MS, 136-42.
I
!
65 Pratt, PR, 130.
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The previous discussion, expecially of the metaphysical
||
importance of the nonrational factor makes it quite clear that
i Pratt’s philosophy in its broad outline aims to be a philosophy
I
|j
of contingency. He persistently contrasts his views with those
I
of the "extreme rationalists" and thus reflects the "tychism"
!
of William James who had such a strong and lingering influence
j|
on his thinking. Pratt continues the war against a "block unl-
I!
i' verse," against a conception of the world as one logical impli-
I
|j
cative system. He urges that such a world view is the result
I;
j
of failing to distinguish between essence and existence. Since
I
! the rationalists are concerned only with conceptual entities
I
and definable natures, their philosophy can well be nothing
I
j
more than "cosmic logic." Pratt Insists that logic is regula-
jj
tive but not constitutive so the world is not logical through-
||
jj
out. Existence, as he has often said, has an extra-logical or
!l
!|
nonrational aspect. "The admission of the non-conceptual ex-
|
! I
i!
perience into the real," says Pratt, "is a serious and signifi-
|l cant admission. It commits the one who makes it to empiricism,
i!
! and to a form of philosophy for which the world cannot be en-
I
I
' tirely luminous."®^
|
I
The recognition of a nonrational element commits Pratt
ji
ij to a philosophy of contingency. Such a comm i tment entails:
ii
h pluralism, individualism, and the assertions that terms have
|; both intrinsic and relational qualities, that causation is not
I
j
logical, and that time and change are real.
Pratt, PR, 61.

At the same time there is another side of Pratt’s posi-
tion which must not be ignored: The assertion that definable
natures, epistemological objects, essences are really insepar-
able from the purely empirical element and that together they
constitute a substance means the world has an unmistakable
rational character throughout. And the belief that relations
partly constitute terms so that the world is an organic whole
of interrelated reals m.eans that even on the level of the real-
istic hypothesis, which is offered as "ample for our theoreti-
cal needs," the organic, implicative character of the universe
is undeniable. Such a stand reveals that Pratt is trying to re4
conclle the claims of James and Royce, of tychism and absolutlsil^
i
By importing a nonratlonal element into whatever may be asserted
as real and by pursuing the ramifications of such a move Pratt
has to a degree succeeded in this reconciliation. But it is
still necessary to reconcile contingency with his ultimate
metaphysical hypothesis, spiritual pantheism. This is a topic
for the following chapter where it will also be shown how one
may have a "rationalism" that is harmonious with contingency
providing Pratt’s narrow use of the term rational (as abstract
concepts, pure logic and mathematics) is abandoned.
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' CHAPTER IV
')
ii
i APPRAISAL OF MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF THE NONRATIONAL FACTOR
I
;t
||
A, The Real and the Rational,
' In an earlier chapter it was suggested that there is an
I
I
I inconsistency between Pratt’s theory of knowledge tnd his meta-
i
i
physical views. His epistemology is quite clear and consistent
j|
in its formal outline. Ambiguities enter with the distinction
Ij between essence and existence which perpetuates a certain as-
i!
Ij pect of his theory of knowledge -- the distinction between epi-
'I
h
[j
stemological and ontological object,
jj
Pratt clearly and positively states that the epistemo-
I
logical objects characterize the ontological object,^ Apparent-
II
Ij
ly this means that the form of any object is its essence. In
Ij
addition, the object has content — a nonrational purely empiri-'
I
cal elem.ent. This is what Pratt seems to mean when he says that
II the givenness of the existent is not a definable quality (esseaicei
ij
|i or form) and hence that there is in existence a nonrational
!j
ji element. The epistemological object is the form, symbol, or
t|
jj
concept of a possible object, ViHien it has a specific and ex-
II
perienced content, there is an actual object. This is what '
j!
seems to be implied in Pratt’s insistence that any substance or
ii
j]
actuality is not a thing without qualities but alv/ays a combi-
i
1 Of, Pratt, PR, 191, 205
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,
nation of "whatness" nnd "thatness," So the conclusion is ines-
capable that the real is always an organic unity of nonrational
givenness and rational form. This conclusion clarifies Pratt *s
frequent remark that the rational is not the whole of the real*
It illuminates his statement that there is "an empirical, non-
rational, given element within reality . . . . " But the remainder
I
of the above quotation is the source of confusion and ambiguity:
the recognition of the nonrational element within reality "pre-
cludes the identification of the rational with the real."^ Pratt
has already said that concepts, essences, and universals char-
acterize real things, that any real object is a combination of
"whatness" and "thatness," and, by lm.plication, that although
the rational is not the whole of the real it is an undeniable
part of it.
This part of Pratt’s argujnent, which is the excuse for
his tight and fast distinction between essence and existence
and his harsh attack on "extreme rationalism," must be
straightened out* It can be straightened out by redefining
reason and rational so they are more in harmony with his laud-
able discussion of explanation:
This seeing the hitherto isolated thing in its proper
perspective, in its setting within a larger web or pat-
tern characterized bj?- its more important relationships
-- this is what I have in mind by "explanation" when I
insist that the function of philosophy is to "explain
our experience* m3
!
2 Pratt, PR, 61* (Ital. mine) Of* ibid., 66*
3 Ibid*, 103. Cf. ibid*, 214, 356*

\I
I
i
jl
ii
I
\
|i
p
!!
Pratt’s words suggest that the rational may he a whole coherent
experience in which one part gains light from the whole which
is grasped at once. In this sense rational is more than the
|
I
purely logical and abstract. Clearly Pratt has a narrow con-
ception of reason. It is abstract logic, syllogistic argument
in contrast to a whole coherent experience. Hence, Pratt says:
Reasoning and the evidence make their contribution
to one’s total view of things but so do also all of
one’s nature, all of one ’ s experience
I
There is a different result when rationality means the coherent
j
organization and interpretation of experience.
Pratt is certainly right that the real is more than pure
logic or mathematics. He is right in asserting that whatever !
is real is ultra-rational, is more than "rational" in the
{
strict meaning of that term. Pure logical form (concepts, es-
sences, universals ) and empirical elements are moments of any-
thing that is real or actual, as Pratt has often inferred. Any-
thing that is real is an organic unity of essences And a non-
rational element. Thus, reality may be rational in the sense
of being a coherent consistent system. The real may be ration-
al in that it may be a whole coherent experience which includes
a formal element and given empirical facts.
Such a conception of the real is concrete and genuinely
empirical for it recognizes that pure logic and brute fact are
really abstractions. Pratt’s sharp distinction between essence
1
Ii
ji
jj
4 Pratt, PR, 567. (Ital. mine)

4..--
and existence is partly the hypostatization of these abstrac-
tions, Part of the time he sees- they are abstractions. He sees
that essences and concepts are only the form, possible struc-
ture, token, or "whatness" of actual things. And he recognizes
that brute fact is only a part of any entity which is really
the actualization of abstract possibility. Most of the tlm*e,
though, Pratt is confused. The confusion is apparent when he
firmly and flatly insists that an essence is never Identical
with existence. Yet it is evident that existence is meaning-
less without forra or definable nature. Again, the confusion
comes out when Pratt talks aboLit the givenness of both the es-
sences and the existents although he has asserted that exist-
ence is never given but is hypothetical. He is driven to say
that existence is in some way and some sense given because it
is characterized by a purely empirical aspect. He is led to
say essences are given because, as a critical realist, he con-
siders them to be data of probable knowledge of objects.
By accepting the term rational as it was defined above
one can avoid some of the extremes to which Pratt is taken by
his rigorous use of Aristotelian logical analysis. If Pratt
were to agree that the rational is the coherent rather than the
purely consistent, he could avoid hypostatizing concepts, quali-
ties, and symbols into a realm of essence and secure a more ade-
quate explanation of the relation between the epistemological
and ontological object. He could give at least a self-consist-
ent use to the concept of givenness by making brute facts as
well as logic part of a coherent whole. Finally, he could ex-
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' tions because experience is never fully coherent.
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!
Pratt’s intuition that any thing that is real contains
I
ij both "whatness" and "thatness," concepts and brute fact is
right. He is led to extremes by persistent use of Aristotelian
l| logical analysis and the subject-predicate form of thought. In
i;
jj
spite of his claims to an empirical method, his is one of ab-
i'
1! stract analysis as though he had Ignored the clues given in his
ii
I. estimation of vvhat constitutes philosophical explanation.
I
B. The Polemic Against "Rationalism." I
I
!
j
Pratt’s polemic against rationalism, as it has been sug-
|
ji gested, is the product of his narrow conception of the meaning
j
Ij
!j of rational as formal consistency and pure logic that excludes
i
j
diversity of facts and experience. He wants to give a place to
j
I
'
I
;
individuality, brute fact, and contingency. Hence rationalism
i' is pictured as the juggling of concepts, as cosmic logic in
ii
jl
which all relations are internal and in which cause is reduced
•1 to the operation of formal logic’s Law of Identity. In Pratt’s
if
jj
view rationalism is that abstract, formal, ethereal Weltanschau-^
i!
I
j!
ung in which, to parody Hegel, all cows are white in a snowy
|l pasture.
t
)
|!
It seems that Pratt’s attack on "extreme rationalism" is
a charge against his conception of what Plato, Leibniz, Hegel,
and some of the post-Hegelians ought to say of they carry their
views to logical extremes. The very fact that Pratt never
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!ri"mentions specifically an "extreme rationalist" provokes suspi
'' cion. Perhaps A. E. Murphy is also suspicious of the polemic
li
it
I'
against "rationalism";
'i
)j
;i It would he an exaggeration to say that critical
|! realism and its leading controversial antagonists
have been in large part an attack on theories no-
body holds in defense of facts that nobody denies.
But it would be an exaggeration v/ith more than a
grain of truth in It,^
One wonders if Pratt may not be, in the main, attacking
a caricature or straw man. His criticisms hardly apply to Kant
who inspired many modern idealisms. At the very beginning of
Kritik der relnen Vernunft Kant urged that knowledge, both sci-
entific and metaphysical, must be more than juggling of analy-
tic propositions in the manner of the "dogmatic rationalists."
Knowledge must include the data of experience ( Empfindung ) ,
^
Later, in his explanation of the categories, Kant argued that
i| the mark of actuality is sensation: "Was mlt den materialen Be-
= dingungen der Erfahrung (der Empfindung) zusammenhfingt 1st
I
wirklich,"'^ With Pratt’s own conditions Kant cannot be called
i
,
one of those rationalists who merely juggles concepts and ig-
i nores brute fact. Even though Kant could not justify the his-
I
toric metaphysical claims of pure speculative reason, he recog-
! nized that metaphysics must take cognizance of experience,
®
5 Murphy, Art. 1, 291.
I
® Of. Kant, KrV, Bl, B29, _et passim .
! 7 Ibid., B266,
8 Cf. ibid., B14-17.
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,
The same may he said for Hegel who is often lampooned as
the arch-rationalist with a philosophy that is nothing more thaij
a "bloodless ballet of categories," In his Vorlesungen iiber
li die Geschichte der Philosoohie Hegel criticizes Bacon, who set
If
I
forth the principles of all empirical philosophy, not for say-
i|
j
ing that sensation is indispensable to kno?;ledge but rather for
j
failing to understand its relation to thought, Hegel incorpor-
[
ates the truth of Bacon’s position into his oioti: "Es 1st ftir
I
die Idee notwendig, dass die Partikularitfit des Inhalts ausge-
I bildet werde, Eine wesentliche Seite 1st der Begriffe, aber
i
' ebenso wesentlich die Endlichkeit desselben als solchen,"9
Furthermore, the absolutism of Bradley takes cognizance of a
nonratlonal factor, for his viev; of the real combines empirical
i
voluntaristic, and rational elements,-^^
It would seem then, that some of the outstanding "ration
allsts" and absolutists have provided for contingency in their
philosophies in much the same way as Pratt has done. They have
recognized that a philosophical description of the real must be
I
)
i more than abstract concepts or essences and must pay respects
|j
ji to experience. The nonratlonal, empirical aspect of things is
i;
ji no more submerged in some of the famous organic philosophies
'i
than it is in Pratt’s own 'brganic conception of the cosmos, "H
!! 9 Hegel, VGP, III, 175, Cf, also VGP, III, 181-82, 257, 295,
II
303, 363; Hegel, PG, 19, 83, 88, 180-82,
i
ji Cf, Bradley, AR, 455,
j!
|j
Cf, Pratt, PR, 273.

Even if it is a most difficult task to find any "extreme
rationalists" who are content to deal only with what Pratt calls!
!
' the realm of essence, one must sympathize withW.s effort to deaHj
\
j
with the empirical and contingent. In fact Pratt’s own philos-
ophy, just as most of the great historic systems, is a mil-xture
of the two emphases. In his theory of relations he recognizes
I
that they are "both external and Internal. In spite of his
stress upon the reality of individuals, he is not an atomist.
He believes that "everything in the universe influences every-
! thing else... that the world is a whole. Even more to the
!j
|i point is his recognition that his plurality of substances is by
I!
“
j! no means a resting place on the road to philosophical truth.
1}
"The solution of the world riddle," sa^rs Pratt, "narrows down
i!
ii
jj
to a choice betv/een Realism and Absolute or Personal Ideal-
|i - _
;j
ism...."-^^ And his final flight to spiritual pantheism takes
the sting out of his polemic against rationalism with the
weapons of pluralism, contingency, and a "non-rational universe.
’f
C. The Nonratlonal Factor and "Ultimate Guesses."
Pratt believes his simple realistic view is sufficient
j
for explaining the appearance and order of experiences because
i
i it has in its favor a higher degree of probability than the moi^
i
acceptable alternatives.!'^ In addition he is impelled, perhaps
!2 Pratt, PR, 273. Of. ibid., 165-66.
I
Ibid., 217.
i
I
14 cf. ibid., 217.
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for personal and aesthetic reasons, to make some guess about
i
the ultimate explanation of the universe. He would set his
I,
f "ample” realism in the framework of a spiritual pantheism so
il conceived as to avoid the individuality-destroying consequences
II
ij
of absolutism, either the Indian or the Roycean variety,
i In his discussion of the alternatives to realism Pratt
admits there are other views besides the one he defends which
ji
explain experience, which explain "the rise of particular ex-
i|
i|
periences, and the coincidences between them. Pragmatism
l|
jl and objective idealism fail to qualify as genuine alternatives
|! for neither makes any real effort to account for the comings
I
jj
and goings of experiences.^^ Besides realism, absolute or per-
il
sonal Idealism and perhaps panpsychism are "eternal possibili-
ties." These alternatives cannot be proved false or unques-
tionably true. The question between them is one of relative
probability. Of realism, absolute or personal idealism, and
panpsychism Pratt says:
I am, therefore, convinced that in our attempt to
explain the facts of human experience we must choose
between these three philosophies. 1*7
' As mentioned, Pratt chooses realism which is more probable and
which is amole for theoretical needs.
15
Pratt, PR, 218.
16 Cf. ibid., 218, 109, 112-13.
17 Ibid., 219.
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Furthermore. Pratt helleves that there are three live
I
I
1: possibilities for explaining the ultimate nature of the cosmos.
if
Naturalism and atheistic pluralism must he dispensed with. The
Ij
li
former denies the existence of anything that defies its analy-
1
;
j' tic method. It leadp to behaviorism or materialism which en-
»
}
tail "the eventual denial of consciousness and the suicide of
I
all thought. The latter, atheistic pluralism, avoids the
f
I
difficulties of naturalism by recognizing the reality of con-
i{
ii sciousness as well as matter. However, it offers no exnlana-
ij
1
tion of the origin of conscious beings. It is more a descrip-
I
tion of the obvious than a philosophical hypothesis. This
fault obviously infects the theory of emergent evolution. Pratt
ij
i; rightly insists that
ji A philosophical hypothesis -- as contrasted v;ith a
i| scientific or an historical description -- means to
{ throw light on the given, to enable us to understand
||
the facts of our world a little better than we should
jl
without it, to bring some degree of unity into the
|j
chaos of the merely presented.
i In making such an hypothesis the philosopher cannot be satis-
I
; fied v;ith merely logical principles or generalizations of a
ii
j! larger law. Pratt believes that philosophers must resort to
n
il pi
I, explanation through conscious purpose. Such an hypothesis
il
jj
Of. Pratt, PR, 295; 244-45.
[i 19 cf. ibid., 355-56, 363.
Il
20 Ibid., 356.
ii
21 Cf, ihid., 363-64.
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'! for explaining the ultimate nature of the cosmos is firmly
I
"based on the descriptive facts of emergent evolution. In Pratt
I
I
!
view it admits of three formulations: deism or transcendental
I theism and the conception of the finite G-od, spiritual panthe-
I
i
ism, and a"bsolute idealism.
1
I
A deism or theism reminiscent of the seventeenth and
I
eighteenth century which makes God wholly transcendent to the
world really has no defenders so Pratt dismisses it shortly.
li
: But the theism with a finite God cannot be disposed of so easi-
i
I
ly. It has a strong moral appeal and much "of a theoretical
j
sort can be said in its favor." Nevertheless Pratt finds
* finitistic theism inadequate on at least two grounds: "This is
not the kind of explanation of our universe that the intellect
j
seeks, nor is it the Determiner of Destiny which our religious
pp
(I
nature demands."^ More will be said later of the finite God
ij
and Pratt’s reaction to it. 1
jl I
!
Pratt finds himself faced with a choice between absolute'
I
I
I
idealism and spiritual pantheism or immanent theism. Either the
j
I Indian or Roycean variety of absolute idealism has several as-
j
i
I
j
pects which, according to Pratt, make it untenable. The per- i
I
'
i feet unitary Brahma blots out the existence of finite minds. It I
I I
!
is too m.onistic.23 There are similar objections to Roycean ab-
j
I
I
}
solute idealism. Such a position tends to identify finite
i
22 Pratt, PR, 372.
23 Of. ibid., 372-73.
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I
consciousness with absolute consciousness and destroy the indi-
i
viduality and plurality defended in personal realism. Like
James Pratt wonders how it is possible to reconcile error, ig-
j|
norance, and failure with the absolute which shares the experi-
i{
li
ence of its finite parts. So Pratt would modify absolute ideal-
il
It
i| ism by attributing to the Divine Mind an infinite knowledge
81 .
about while recognizing that "an actual distinction between its
<;
Ij
experiences and the limited experiences of its finite ’parts,
|l
I That is what Pratt means in part by his own spiritual panthe-
I' P4-
!! ism or immanent theism,*^
To understand the relation of Pratt's "ultimate guess"
to the central problem of this investigation, it is necessary
first of all to give a brief description of the God of spiritu-
al pantheism, Pratt believes that the universe is an organic
whole which is nevertheless full of variety and constant change
It is temporal in that it is a beginningless and endless procesij
in time. This universe is ultimately a 'conscious life so all
i
its activities are the efficient purposes of the Cosmic Mind,
The physical order is really the living body of God. But the
efficient -Durnoses of the Cosmic Self are not nlans realized
!i
.
i
j!
through instrumentalities or means, God is at his goal much
l:ike "the continuing achievement of a work of art by an un-
!
hampered artist," His purposing is the process of the universe
Following a musical analogy, Pratt says: "The Spiritual Pan-
24 T)ratt, PR, 374.
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theism of my hypothesis is more like the composer improvisingl'25
There is no working our of a previous plan nor is there a pur-
poseless operation. Pratt follows a Hindu suggestion:
The cosmic process the Indians have often called
the Dance of Shiva. The conception is that the
Divine never works hut ever plays. Its activity
is only sport.... Ho instrument is here used or
needed; the dancer is his own instrument.... The
purpose is a continuing purpose ever changiniP* in
detail but retaining throughout the entire process
its essential self-identity. 26
Such a God is not to be approached merely by cold reason
but by disinterested aesthetic appreciation. 27 jjis beauty must
If
i'
jl not be obscured by moralisms for He makes the sun shine on the
il
j! evil and good, just and unjust. Accordingly, God is "terrify-
II
ij
ing" as well as "safe." In God there is a trace of the
il
ij
Dionysian spirit as his life includes finite death and his de-
!j
light includes anguish, pleasure, and pain, the terror of
82
.
storms as well as the calm of June. 28 But all these elements
i
j
are so united that if man could fully comprehend God, they
'f
! would be beautiful. As was mentioned earlier, the Cosmic Mind
j
|! is not identical with human consciousnesses or wills. He may
know about them completely but cannot ^ them. Hence the price
of individuality may be temporary defeat of the divine will.
||
25 Pratt, PR, 376.
I
26 Ibid., 377.
27 cf. ibid., 378.
28 Cf. ibid., 379.

\{
I
II
Does the central problem of this essay -- the nonration-
al factor — have any bearing on Pratt's conception of God?
There is a hint that it does in Pratt's remark that doubtless
I
there is in efficient purpose, in the Cosmic Self's activity,
"a given element which we simply have to accept,"^® This state-
ment may mean one of two things : that man as a moral and know-
ing creature merely has to accept aspects of his universe as
being opaque, nonrational, or beyond comprehension; or, that
one must recognize intheory that there is brute fact or an un-
created surd element in the ontic structure of the universe#
The former interpretation goes little beyond the general argu-
ment of the previous chapter. The latter seems to carry the
nonrational element into Pratt's basic metaphysical hypothesis.
Ij If Pratt were to assert that there is eternally "given"
i!
I)
i- to the v/ill of God an uncreated, nonrational surd element, he
li
^ ^
M
M
jj
would, in one respect at least, move toward the conception of
ii
I
a finite God, toward a God with a limited will. But Pratt has
||
quoted and rejected Brightman's view of "The Given." From The
ij
'
j
Problem of God Pratt takes Brightman's words:
I
There is in God's nature in addition to his reason
!
and his active creative will, a passive element v/hlch
I
enters into every one of his conscious states, as
: sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and
constitutes a problem for him. This element we call
"The Given",.. His v/ill and his reason acting on The
j
Given produce the world and achieve value in It.^*^
Pratt, PR, 382.
30 Pratt, Art. 16, 166 from Brightman, Problem of God, 113.

But a finite God, ”a struggling, often thwarted God, who has
noble aims, uses various means to achieve them, yearns for a
better world, and who may eventually with our aid realize his
glorious hopes," is not acceptable to Pratt because this con-
ception satisfies neither the intellect nor the religious con-
sciousness*^^
If the intellect can be satisfied by a coherent hypothe-
sis, it cannot be so easily contented with Pratt's view as with
the hypothesis of a finite God. For Pratt's theistic hypothesi
is Incoherent at several points. Pratt attributes to the in-
finite Cosmic Self "genuine and supreme goodness. "^2 yet this
Dionysian absolute "is full of finite death, his delight in-
cludes sorrow and anguish. . .pleasure and pain..., wildness,
cold, darkness, and joy. "33 Pratt suggests, hov/ever, that this
divine diabolical streak is deceptive. In the last analysis
God is not really a Holy Terror. If man could comprehend God
fully, he "should find in the Whole an overwhelming and un-
speakable beauty, a beatific vision. Again, Pratt bolsters
the assertion of God's infinite goodness by the familiar argu-
ment that the fact of evil is probably a case of ethical and
aesthetic misapprehension:
Cf. Pratt, PR, 372.
il
|i Ibid., 384,
jj
23 Ibid., 379.
it
1 .
34 ibod., 380.
|!
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,
It may be.. .what we call evil when taken in con-
junction with what we know as good, in all its
temporal and other relations, forms a necessary
part of the perfect Who^, and an -anreplaceable
aspect of the infinitely Beautiful.^^
If one believes in an infinite God, he may crudely attribute
the facts of natural evil and disproportionate human pain to
devils. Or he may explain those facts away. Although Pratt *s
God at times seems very devilish, serious incoherence in the
theistic hypothesis is avoided by explaining evil away. But
such atactic only pushes the issue back a step. For Pratt, in
spite of his professed respect for facts and empirical method,
chooses to blink the impressive experienced mass of disvalues.
There is another point wherein Pratt’s view of God is
incoherent. The Cosmic Self does not plan or scheme. 36 ue
does not work out a plan, but rather spontaneously creates and
improvises directly, without use of means, for contrivance is
a consequence of limitation of power. Such a view no doubt
preserves the omnipotence and infiniteness of God. But there is
a question as to whether such a being can be called rational
and good. Laying aside the question of cohceivability, one
must certainly feel that such a spontaneous, planless being is
ultimately the apotheosis of irrationality. Pratt can hardly
be asserting the "extreme otherness" of God, for he has turned
Pratt, Art. 3.6, 168. (Ital. mnne)
I
^®Cf. Pratt, PR, 375.
II
i;
37 Cf. Pratt, Art. 16, 167-68.
I;

purposely from transcendent theism to immanent theism. More-
over, Pratt asserts that reality is temporal. It is "a hegin-
ningless and endless process ^ time,"5S yet there is no recog-
nition that a real time would have any relation, as a limita-
tion or otherwise, to the purposing of Ood,
These Incoherencies can he avoided hy the hypothesis of
a finite God. Such a conception does not explain away the facts
of natural evil and disproportionate pain hut attributes them
to the ncnratlonal, given elements within the experience of
God. Such elements are given to the will of God, and he con-
trols, orders, and rationalizes them. Pratt’s other views
readily suggest such an hypothesis, hut he refuses to sacri-
fice any of God’s unlimited, infinite power to save his good-
ness. Moreover, the finite God is a rational, limited being.
His will conforms to the lav/s of reason and actualizes ideal
values. Such a being conforms. to the Platonic standard that
the good is the determinate or limited or harmoniousV Things
are good and rational not merely because God wills them. God
wills them because they are supremely rational and good, Pratt’s
infinitely good God wills what he wills v/ithout plan or limita-
tion, Devils, Pratt says, do the same thing. If this is not
admitted, there is only the barren nonmoral tautology that God
wills what he v/ills,'^*^ Furthermore, the will of the finite God,
||
38 Pratt, PR, 375. (Ital. mine) Cf. ibid., 163-64.
I'
Cf. Jowett, DP, III, 17072.
I
' Cf. Pratt, Art. 16, 155.
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may be conceived as limited by time* In this case the temporal
process, as a fact of experience, is "given" to the will of God
But Pratt makes no attempt to reconcile his unlimited God with
a real and apparently independent temporal process* Pratt
patently gives the lie to his assertion that a finite God is
less intellectually satisfying when he admits that the hypothe-
sis may be more defensible than his own view but less satisfy-
ing for the deeply religious person*^!
Pratt’s strongest argument for an infinite God "unblem-
ished" by a nonrational element within his personality is to be
found in the demands of religious experience* The finite God
who is man’s ally in the struggle against evil makes a strong
moral appeal, admits Pratt* But in the presence of such a God
those who have heard "the call of the Infinite will feel a kind
of cosmic nostalgia, Those who are mystically inclined, who
are unsatisfied by definite conceptions, long for the Infinite,
Pratt concludes the argument from, religious experience with
these words:
just how, if at all, this conception of God could be
made to square with the facts of human life it is
not the function of this paper to investigate *43
It is primarily a question for the theologian and not the phil-
osopher, But at least the philosopher can say that a religious
87
.
Cf, Pratt, Art* 16, 164*
Ibid*, 166, Cf, ibid,, 163-64, 166; Pratt, PR, 382-83.
Pratt, Art* 16, 169.
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' demand or mystical experience is only a trnth-claim. The fact
I
one desires or craves something does not prove or disprove its
!!
jl existence in the form desired. The intuitions of the mystic
I
cannot he "intellectually satisfying" to the philosopher until
they have heen coherently thought about and interpreted, A
finite God who has a nonrational factor in his exnerience, a
j
surd element which is "given" to his will, has been shov/n to be
j
a more coherent hypothesis than Pratt’s for an ultimate explana
I
I
tion of the cosmios. It has seemed more "intellectually satis-
I
I
fying." Perhaps Pratt’s own maxim should be taken seriously;
To som.e this may be a very unsatisfactory conclusion,
’.'’/hether it is satisfactory is not nearly so impor-
tant a question as the question Is it truej44
44 Pratt, PR, 217.
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SUMMARY
The significance of the nonratlonal factor can be deter-
mined by internal and historical criticism of Pratt *s dualism.
The first method involves examination of the primary sources,
Pratt’s writings. The secondary sources are the various criti-
cisms of Pratt’s views and the materials used in historical
criticism. The nonratlonal factor may be defined tentatively
as the given brute fact of unreasoning sensation which is more
than and beyond the concepts, definable natures, and expressed
qualities of anything that may be said to exist. By the funda-
mental term dualism is meant the ineradicable epistemological
difference between the content of the mind and its object,
Pratt’s dualistic personal realism is a species of critical
realism which developed in reaction to the monism of absolute
Idealism and neorealism. Nevertheless it shows the impress of
Royce, Indian philosophers, and William James, The problem of
the nonratlonal factor is related primarily to the question of
the place of the empirically given in knowledge and contingency
or chance elements in the universe.
The basis of asserting a nonratlonal element is to be
found in Pratt’s theory of meaning as representation which har-
m.onizes with epistemological dualism. Since only symbols can
have meaning, they alone can be defined. Definitions clarify
symbols not things and ultimately rest on immediate awareness,
the merely given nonratlonal factor. Pratt’s dualistic eplsteml*
ology is a further basis for asserting a nonratlonal factor.
89 .
K t.
-. to^ 30 m;«3 ‘i:>^0k\t ±^' i 3r':t ;1q
’
:s' ecfT
, :
T.r I ,:, rrj t e » 'to ..I ? 1 0 t .i 0 'li? 0 1TO ‘a .tf^, beta r',-;.iri © Srst jer -^jrr
oo‘«-''i>e '?:o fioJ:d.-5Xi.ti;u‘?7vO sovXpyxr.t r. • Oitrj>
-'-^'*0 Si#r '•' p'T. ".^yrijr s TT/iE'/i'^ore ©flT . fi’sso.l ' '
iit b^pxx ©ri-: trxjt; s^r^eiv a' lo *qJ;o
;
V •'f.v •’ 3j?dr =» ' 'lonj'TeL' oc s^XiT ,nf*^'
'
,
; '?
a'x--:.<: fLt ac/''-t''arv3 30l':.:-stie'tiix; ic- .-toj’.t, >p'.x
I •
•.‘p.',iao-tci:9
^
it ©I'/h;"! .-
^
lyaor?o.o oj - . :i '-reef ’ trfA rias
- e:il 'iE Qi ?>t. ^emr lc>
e Xtf^r>x t90 • ?'£Ti si;-«tsM'«vv nnf>:f.
•
'
,
*
.
J !'
t"3 b'llr orli lo jA<=:)avo a/xrf./xroer^rfpcf Po.':a':"-s'j":-'b;.-
I'vi K€Joo<;i‘ -*:*• Bi i oXrJeiCEA.’ e ’
f* .tjxlo OCX' -‘to fas inorr- ^ no i; 7 o.3fn o. : r>© I
n
v1
0
' r<^ frrs £ r>.
*y SQO'iCriu 'M rsf'XQf^dipdVc, . wBils
1q /noXx^'yty ooT , s'euisl, .tTJpXilXV? i:rrr ^a*-arfc«'60Xi;rfiD nB.lbr7 ^
'to CIO xi-s ?/;- :/:fi o•^ YibS‘-*>il*zq ^ Xerro.tiATr'ofi
•
tonngnidno 0 bfiu. 87frsIv/om£ ni YTStioi'i’xiirts 6Xj' xO.opjtlrr
*V?-V
.aa'xovxftxf rri; i'‘iE:i'3Xr; v.orixj^fo
9Cf O'i gX ;t*T©m3ls X£<noX;ts*mo;t a lo elr-.ad ©riT
.
•• •
•'
?•
-rrftff rto^ BB 3i7-'ni:eii 'lo -^a-ocnX nX.
rxjeo aXodifTT;^ .icsxX,?;;; I,?oXjrj..yxOi*f€-w^;ia» iXXX’' sa.^
r.
\:llT[B.Co onr ":'I8 .ban^'iei^ njao.‘>i1olo v:oi-
^
80©'i^’<'tfev»'6 ©>ftXfceHum-f, f£C» ^X'^ioocyXIif ‘*jib '^forr 3Xc-tfffp;r©.i
Ux.'W'/jL<
t-'i
7.‘it
j tioialqo oJ tc?rriif \*fcXce'J:, X£.fioXX/»'i/'?o:T ^XdTftrcr sriX- V;
= , rgri^vn. %,Vr 'V-ff :.x ' .- -
.^
'
r< ,
•M'VlwSt
"
'
'
'
- V ' •
.
»
I;
for the ontological object has an intrinsic, indefinable, given
aspect beyond its epistemological counterpart, beyond its es-
sence* Again, Pratt’s theory of truth implies a nonrational
factor. Since the rationalistic coherence theory of truth ex-
cludes everything but essences, concepts, or definable natures,
it cannot deal with existence and the given. But the corres-
pondence theory, to which Pratt subscribes, allows referends to
be existents which are characterized by a mere datum or non-
rational element. Moreover, Pratt’s external- Internal theory
of relations avoids annihilating terms in an im.plicative logi-
cal web which constitutes them. It shows that relations pre-
suppose re lata which have an inherent and indefinable quale or
nonrational element.
The nonrational factor has an important place in the
answer to metaphysical questions. Everything Pratt regards as
ultimate and real has an aspect which is outside reason, which
is nonrational. Although Pratt’s dualistic personal realism is
not intended to be primarily a metaphysic, it does have bear-
ings on ontology. Epistemology leads to investigation of the
I
existential world. Thirgs, substances, or existents have an
indefinable nonrationcl aspect beyond the expressed qualities
and concepts of them. Although essences are eternal, things
may transfer essences. This explains change and identity.
Similarly, selves are existents or substances. The self is a
sui generis substance that is more than the qualities (its es-
ji sence) revealed by introspection. It is akin to the transcend-
ental ego of traditional phi losophy, and like other existent s
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has its nonrational aspect. Coordinate with this conception of
substance there is that of essence. The realm of essence com-
prises unlversals, propositions, concepts, laws, and epistemo-
logical objects or meanings. Characterization of the realm of
essence gives a negative definition of the distinguishing mark
of an existent, its nonrational element. The nonrational fac-
tor is the kernel of Pratt’s answer to the problem of contin-
gency, His cosmos is m,ore thanUie realm of essences or logical
structures of "extreme rationalism." It is a whole of inter-
related reals each of which has its ovm intrinsic, conceptually
opaque, nonrational aspect. Causality is thus more than logi-
cal necessity. Time and change are real.
Although Pratt recognizes that every existent is an
organic unity of rational form and nonrational content, he trle^
at the same time to preclude the identification of the rational
with the real. The validity of his distinctions suggests that
the term rational should be redefined so as to be in harmony
with his conception of philosophical explanation, "Rational"
need not refer merely to logical abstractions, pure forms, or
possibilities. It may mean the organic, coherent system. The
real may be rational as the coherent organization of conceptual
forms or definable natures (abstract logic; possibility) with
given empirical elements, Pratt’s polemic against "extreme
rationalism" is the result of his narrow conception of reason
and his passion for contingency. Examination of statements by
supposed arch-rationalists suggests, however, that Pratt may be
attacking straw men. Historic organlclsts give as much place
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jl to individuality and chance as Pratt does with his external-in-
ji
jl ternal theory of relations which implies that ever7/thing in the
ll
|j
universe influences everything else -- the world is a whole.
j;
Pratt sets his "theoretically ample" realism in the
1'
I
framework of a spiritual pantheism so conceived as to avoid the
(
I
individuality-destroying consequences of absolutism. His re-
ij
mark that doubtless there is in final purpose a "given element"
i:
which man must accept may mean either that man the knower must
accept existence as opaque or that there is an uncreated surd
element in the ontic structure of the universe. If Pratt were
to pursue the latter suggestion, he might come to a God whose
ji will is limited by an uncreated nonrational element within his
ij
|- experience. Pratt rejects this f inite God as not satisfving to
ji the intellect or religious consciousness. But a critique of
I;
II
Pratt’s theistic h3rpothesis shov/s it to be more incoherent and
!i
t
j|
less intellectually satisfying than finitistic theism. Further
i!
]
II more, the experience of the deeply religious, the mystics, is
I
!l onlv datum for interpretation. It is a truth-claim not conclu-
|!
Ij
sive proof for infinitistic theism. The hypothesis of a finite
jl
I
jl God seems to be a more coherent one. It recognizes, the ontic
il character of the nonrational factor.
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